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Abstract 
Transaction cost economics is one of the dominant paradigms in the study of outsourcing, namely 
in the study of what to outsource. However, many findings have questioned its power to explain or 
predict outsourcing. On the other hand, in recent years and decades the importance of complexity 
has been noted, and also that complexities tend to make it hard to use linear theories – such as 
transaction cost economics. 
In this thesis, transaction cost economics is studied carefully in order to show why its ability to 
predict either the decision to or the success of outsourcing is weakened by the complexities in 
economies, organizations, etc. Since complexity is the reason of the failure, also some foundations 
for a theory that takes it into account are expected to be laid. 
In order to approach the problem, each of the transaction cost economical constructs individually, 
as well as the theory in its entirety, are analyzed against economics, game theory, and complexity 
theory. The new theory is based on the findings from these analyses. 
The failure of transaction cost economics is successfully identified and related to complexities 
regarding the problems caused by statistics, nonlinear functions, iterated games, and so on. New 
theory that does not suffer from the weaknesses of linearity is also outlined. However, such an 
approach is not recommended because of its complexity: the theory requires a vast array of 
knowledge to be used (as opposed to the simple theories that fail under complexity). Also, it is 
extremely case-specific, and it will be difficult to operationalize. Furthermore, like other theories, it 
has a touch of tautology in it. 
Because of the problems related to transaction cost economics (as well as other views mentioned) 
are clear-cut, its use in outsourcing is not recommended. However, since the same applies to a more 
complex theory, the conclusions are rather surprising. In short, the author concludes that we should 
not focus too closely on what we intend to outsource, but rather on how do we handle the process of 
outsourcing. Its scientific study in academia is more likely to produce better generalizable results, 
and learning the principles is in all likelihood much more valuable to businesses (and as a result, to 
business students) than learning the “what theories”. 
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1 Introduction 
Equilibrium is the state of death, only chaos produces life. The Ancient 
Greeks have been driven to extinction by too much search for architectural 
harmony. 
Stéphane Lupasco (1951)  
1.1 Background and motivation 
Outsourcing keeps capturing the imagination of both academia and business, big and small 
alike. However, to paraphrase Robert Solow’s (1987) famous quip, outsourcing can be seen 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics (e.g. Broedner et al. (2009), for a strong and 
negative impact). The reasons to outsource abound, ranging from the bluntly mundane (cost 
reductions) to the downright silly (to follow the fashion), but also to strategic reasons 
(Gonzalez et al., 2010). 
In addition to increasing our understanding of the reasons to outsource, academic 
research has contributed by producing several different frameworks that prescribe what should 
be outsourced and how the process should be handled. This thesis is concerned with the former, 
although understanding complexity may also help with the latter. There are several theories 
that already prescribe the what side, including for instance the resource-based view and the 
theory of core competencies. 
One of the most important theories, if not the most important one, is transaction cost 
economics (TCE). According to the transaction cost theory, the key to sourcing decisions is in 
transaction costs, and particularly in economizing thereon. The transaction costs are likened by 
Oliver E. Williamson (1985, p.19) to friction in physical systems. Friction is defined as the 
force that resists motion, and in physical systems its existence is obvious. Likewise, in 
economic systems costs of running the system must be taken into account, but Williamson 
(ibid.) points out that in neoclassical (or what one might call regular, as opposed to the new 
institutional economics school of which the TCE is a part of) economics the friction is not 
taken into account, and because of that non-standard contracts, such as franchising, were poorly 
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understood. This thesis is mainly focused on outsourcing, not other non-standard modes of 
organization, but there are mentions to those as well. 
What follows logically from the idea of transaction cost theory is that transaction costs 
set natural boundaries of the firm: the decision to make or buy is actually a rather simple cost-
minimizing decision. Simply put, production costs are assumed to be lower at the market, but 
when transaction costs are accounted for, the expected total cost may become higher. Thus, the 
natural boundaries are set where total costs are minimized. This is graphically presented in 
figure 2-2. 
Because of these naturally set boundaries, TCE has often been used as a tool to evaluate 
outsourcing decisions. The usual line of study is to estimate whether outsourcing is explained 
by the assumption that asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty are all inversely correlated 
with outsourcing. 
For some background into the study, this thesis was meant to be yet another outsourcing-
in-light-of-TCE study as I was handed a wonderful data set by the Real-Time Economy 
competence center at Aalto University. However, as I was doing some preliminary exploration 
of the data, the answers to the question what are the main reasons for your decision to 
outsource or keep in-house accounting were such that there was nothing in support of 
transaction cost economics. Thus, forcing the answers on the Likert scale through the TCE 
mincer felt gratuitous.  
At the outset, I had accepted the claim that “(empirical) transaction cost economics is a 
success story that we should celebrate” (Williamson, 1996, p. 27) at face value; I was under 
the assumption that transaction cost economics was indeed found to be an accurate description 
of how organizations behave. But the initial findings led me to believe that there might be 
something else going on. Indeed, several meta-studies, discussed in more detail later in this 
thesis, show that Williamson’s above position is optimistic, to say the least. (Note: this relates 
to outsourcing, not other non-standard modes of contracting.) 
Roughly at the same time as the transaction cost economics rose in popularity (generally 
starting in the 1980s and culminating in the canonization of TCE through the Nobelization of 
Prof. Williamson in 2009) the idea of complexity started to gain a foothold within the scientific 
community. Johnson (2009, p. 3) defines complexity science as “the study of the phenomena 
that emerge from a collection of interacting objects”. I don’t remember clearly at which point 
I stumbled upon complexity, but the study of complex (adaptive) systems and its application 
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into organizations and economies rang a bell. Perhaps opportunism should not be considered a 
problem? 
Developing on that idea in this thesis, I will argue that transaction cost economics does 
not ask the right questions or give the right answers. That is, while there may be an optimal 
structure assuming a static and linear environment, the environment changes and so firms can 
and must account for complexity in order to survive.  
On a final note, complexity in this study is first and foremost a mindset. This study is not 
a traditional complexity study which are often simulations of agents that are allowed to roam 
freely in order to fulfil a set of goals. Some understanding of complex behavior is a must in 
order to follow the logical chains of thought of an if-this-then-that (and if-that-then-this-and-
this-leading-to-such-and-such) manner, but no more than that. 
1.2 Aims of the study 
There are two research questions in this study: 
1. Why transaction cost economics fails when determining sourcing when the complexity 
of organizations and economies is taken into account? 
2. What kind of a theory or framework could better handle the complexities where TCE 
fails? 
The first question is fairly straightforward. First, it will be shown that transaction cost 
economics is not very successful empirically. Second, the theory will be analyzed and 
inconsistencies between the linear theory and the complex real world are explored. 
 The second question is much more difficult. TCE is quite a coherent theory, and in all 
likelihood the theory laid here will be far less precise. However, it is aimed to being much 
more accurate (see figure 1-1). That is, TCE aptly gives answers, but at times they may be 
precisely wrong. I aim to present a theory that is not necessarily precise, i.e. it may be more 
difficult for the user, but perhaps it is more accurate, that is, without a systematic error. In any 
case, the aim is to lay some foundations for a theory that takes complexity explicitly into 
account. 
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Figure 1-1: Precision and accuracy 
Note how the most accurate x of both precise, inaccurate and imprecise, accurate are at 
the same place, at about eight o’clock in the middle circle. This means the two estimations give 
the same answers – but only one of the two has a systematic error. In other words, one of them 
is on average exactly right, but with a measurement error which can be accounted for by 
building in some redundancy.  
1.3 Methodology 
The nature of this thesis is mainly theoretical, but some literature will be reviewed in order to 
back up some claims regarding transaction cost economics and to show some further 
developments from the studies regarding complex systems. 
The theory of transaction cost economics will be drawn chiefly from the works of 
Oliver E. Williamson, but some other sources will be referred to also. The theory regarding 
complexity needs to be somewhat thoroughly explained since it is not standard material among 
business students, but references will likely be few and far between since they are standard 
theory. 
Regarding theoretical work, the intention is to draw from a variety of economic theories 
– this is not a competition between TCE and other theories (like some other studies), but rather 
an attempt to find where TCE fails and an attempt to create theory that would take that into 
account. 
Imprecise, inaccurate Precise, inaccurate 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two major parts, each consisting of two chapters, excluding the 
introductory and the concluding chapters. 
The first part gives an introduction to the topic. In chapter 2, the theoretical background 
is established. First, the theory of transaction cost economics is explained. Second, relevant 
theory regarding complexity is explored and explained carefully to establish both an 
understanding and a common language. Finally, some of the other theories related to 
outsourcing will be looked at for future referencing. 
Chapter three will review the empirical findings related to TCE in sufficient detail in 
order to back up some of the claims made in the thesis. Furthermore, some findings from the 
studies of complex systems will be presented as they are used to challenge the TCE paradigm. 
In the second part, chapter four discusses the failure of transaction cost economics by 
weaving together its theory, some illustrative examples, and the features of complexity. The 
fifth chapter of the thesis proceeds to offer some lessons that we can learn from the studies of 
complex systems. 
Finally, the thesis will naturally have some concluding remarks and recommendations 
for future research. 
1.5 Some definitions 
It is probably useful to define two core concepts before moving forward. The first of these is 
outsourcing (or sourcing in general) which refers to obtaining a certain product (service, 
process, widget) from any organization upon which the contractor has no authority other than 
that stated by the contract. The second is complexity which is very difficult to define, but 
generally that refers to all sorts of systems that cannot be depicted in a linear fashion. 
1.5.1 Outsourcing and insourcing 
Generally, this thesis juxtaposes result and process. The former of these is a non-divisible item 
or service that is achieved through the latter. The process then again refers to any kind of work 
(manual, mental, machine) that must be done in order to achieve a result. 
The non-divisibility refers to the fact that the results cannot be divided a posteriori; for 
instance, invoicing can be divided by type (sales, purchase) or by activity (receiving, sending, 
processing), but when the firm has outsourced, say, sales invoicing, it is buying the non-
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divisible service of sales invoicing, not the services of sales invoice preparing, sending, 
registering, archiving etc. This is not to say that the invoice could not be pulled from the 
archive, corrected, re-entered, etc., but that the process cannot be reversed so that the work put 
into the process could somehow be salvaged. 
Thus, outsourcing in terms of this thesis is defined as obtaining a certain result from an 
external provider. The result is the non-divisible bundle that is generated in the process.  
On the opposite side there is insourcing or integration. This means the generation of the 
said result is achieved through an internal process that can be infinitely divided and re-defined.  
The general implications of the two are that when any asset, process, etc. is outsourced, 
it becomes a fixed job that the contractor is looking to get done. That is, the contractor is paying 
someone to do a job it wishes to get done. On the other hand, when the asset is integrated, the 
firm is looking to enable itself to achieve a result. 
For instance, a warehouse can be either outsourced or integrated. When the warehouse 
is integrated, the firm gets a warehouse with which it can do what it pleases; it can use it for 
warehousing, or it can transform it to an indoor sports center (barring any regulatory 
restrictions), or it can be sold or leased, etc. When the warehouse is outsourced, it depends on 
the contract, but generally it is stated for which use it will be fitted, what will it cost, and how 
long the contract will run for, and in many cases there are also other options (e.g. lease 
expansion, extension, or early termination).  
One of the key points in this thesis will rely on the above idea: outsourcing and 
integration are not exactly comparable, or rather, they are best used to achieve different things 
(contrary to TCE logic where the asset is seen as fixed). 
1.5.2 Complexity 
Complexity is in essence the idea that there are systems that have different parts which interact 
with other parts in many different ways. These systems can consist of other systems, so a 
number of systems can form another system, and it is not hard to see how this quickly results 
in a somewhat messy lump where it is quite difficult to exactly pinpoint causes and effects. 
 Because of that, complex systems (such as economies and all human networks, 
including all kinds of organizations) have a tendency of behaving in manners that go beyond 
the explanatory powers of linear theories. That is, complex systems may seem chaotic in that 
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there seems to be no reason why they function like they do. Indeed, these emergent capabilities 
mean that the systems cannot be understood just by looking at the parts of those systems. 
Generally, though, complexity cannot be explained thoroughly by any clear definitions. 
This is why usually complex systems are approached by explaining their features, that is, what 
kinds of interactions there are within those systems. This approach is also taken in this thesis, 
and the features of complex systems, as far as they are relevant in terms of this thesis, are 
explained in chapter 2.5.1. 
 The relevance of complexity is that transaction cost economics, as well as other linear 
theories, tend to fall apart in the real world. The general reason is that everything affects 
everything else, and back again in loops. This is because of two different issues. First, they are 
rarely capable of taking into account second- and further-order effects. The second is 
endogeneity which stems from two sources: from either a confounding factor, or from a 
causality loop. 
The first-order effects are obvious to the eye, for instance in transaction cost economics 
opportunism can increase the revenue of the opportunist at the cost of the victim. However, the 
second-order effect could be that the victim tells all his friends that the opportunist is an 
untrustworthy opportunist, and this then leads to the opportunist going out of business pretty 
quickly (see chapter 4.4.1). 
Having a confounding factor means that you come up with a variable or a set of 
variables which are not the ones that affect the dependent variable, but something that has 
something in common with the thing that you want to measure. For instance, asset specificity 
might have nothing to do with outsourcing, but some assets that are generally not outsourced 
are also described as specific, and vice versa.  
A causality loop then again refers to the fact that there are not just inputs and outputs, 
but that each affects the other (and different inputs affect other inputs), so saying something is 
more valuable in the current transaction than anywhere else is missing an important disclaimer: 
ceteris paribus. But we know that ceteris does not remain paribus. 
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2 Theory 
In this chapter, the theory regarding transaction cost economics and complexity are explained. 
Because the theory is in such a central role in this thesis, the chapter is lengthy, and the non-
technical reader is advised to read subchapter 2.3 and to see the table at the end of chapter 2.5 
(p. 25) as these aim to explain the theories in a nutshell, using as few technical terms as 
possible. 
2.1 Transaction cost economics 
The price mechanism, a (or even the) central idea of free markets, means that supply and 
demand direct prices of goods and services, as though led by an invisible hand, to borrow a 
famous analogy (wrongly). 
 Transaction cost theory, as set by Ronald H. Coase (1937, p. 390), states that “the main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the 
price mechanism.” This is the central idea of transaction cost economics, although there are 
some differences between the Coasian and the Williamsonian views of the transaction cost 
economies. 
 Oliver E. Williamson (1991, p. 76) claims that this economizing on transaction costs is 
the top priority for any company: “Economy is the best strategy.” According to him, “that is 
the central and unchanging message of the TCE perspective”. While Williamson (ibid.) does 
not completely trash the usefulness of strategy, he asserts that economizing is what counts, that 
most often strategizing is to be used to promote economic behavior, and that students should 
rather learn how to economize than how to strategize. 
 Transaction cost economics then attempts to explain why firms exist and what are their 
boundaries: the existence is explained by those costs (firms exist in order to carry out their aims 
economically in terms of these transaction costs), and the boundaries of the firm are decided 
by what is efficient to do in-house and what is more efficiently done by the market. Next, these 
transaction costs are explained. 
2.1.1 Transaction costs 
There are two types of definitions for transaction costs. Dahlman (1979) divides the costs into 
three categories: discovery (sometimes labelled search and information), negotiation and 
conclusion (bargaining and decision), and other costs which later developed into contract 
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policing costs. These latter types of costs were originally in essence the costs of re-negotiation; 
either re-contracting short contracts or changing longer-term contracts. 
Oliver E. Williamson (1985 p. 20-21) provides a more structured format of the latter 
two types of costs. The costs are divided into two categories, ex-ante and ex-post costs. Ex-
ante costs, or those incurred before the entering an agreement, include drafting, negotiating, 
and safeguarding an agreement. Drafting and negotiating are self-explanatory, but safeguarding 
likely needs some articulation: safeguards are a priori mechanisms that aim to the fulfilment 
of the contract in a way that benefits both sides. For example, common ownership (of a specific 
asset) means that neither side will be able to hold the asset hostage in order to opportunistically 
negotiate a better deal. 
The ex-post costs, incurred when the contract is in force, include maladaptation, 
haggling, governance, and bonding costs. Maladaptation costs are simply the costs of re-
defining the contract while it is still in force, but no longer meaningful for either or both of the 
parties; Williamson (1985, p. 21) argues that maladaptation provides a situation in which 
strongly opportunistic behavior might arise. 
Haggling costs are similar, but involve filling the blanks in an incomplete contract 
rather than changing the contents of a complete one. Governance costs consist of creating and 
maintaining a system to see that the contract is fulfilled. Finally, bonding costs refer to the 
boundaries of the provider, enabling secure, but not always effective fulfilment of the contract, 
i.e. the provider or its employee is not empowered to device a quick ad hoc action plan to 
effectively address an issue, but instead will have to stick to what is stipulated by the contract. 
Table 2-1: Transaction costs 
Ex-ante costs Ex-post costs 
Drafting Maladaptation 
Negotiating Haggling 
Safeguarding Governance 
 Bonding 
 
 
 I believe both Dahlman and Williamson’s definitions are worth mentioning. While 
Williamson’s definitions are better formalized, I have not quite understood why Williamson’s 
definition is missing search costs since the search costs can obviously differ greatly between 
the two modes of acquisition. 
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2.1.2 Asset specificity 
Specific assets, in general, mean assets that have less value everywhere else than in their current 
(or proposed) use. On the opposite side, there are general or non-specific assets which are 
equally valuable everywhere. It should be stressed that asset specificity is the most important 
concept in the transaction cost paradigm (Williamson, 1981, p.555; 1985, p. 52). 
Williamson (1983, p. 55) recognizes four types of specific assets: site-specific, 
physically specific, and human-specific assets as well as dedicated assets. 
The meanings of the four are as follows: a site-specific asset is for example a warehouse 
situated near a factory (see illustration below). Ceteris paribus, the warehouse closer will be 
more valuable to the contractor and so the provider of the said warehouse can opportunistically 
ask for more than the fair price. This naturally implies that the firm would be better off 
acquiring the said warehouse. 
 
Figure 2-1:  Asset specificity. 
In the above case, it can be reasoned that warehouse A is preferred, obviously, by the 
contractor, and that it needs to protect its interests by acquiring rather than leasing the site 
(assuming that total cost of integration do not exceed the value difference) because the lessor 
might opportunistically charge higher prices. 
A physically specific asset is on that is used for a specific purpose. The way it is  
understood and thus used in this thesis is that it does not have to be physical as such; just 
Warehouse A 
Value of specificity 
Asset specificity. In this case, 
TCE would order us to acquire 
warehouse A if the costs of 
internal organization are less 
than the difference between the 
loss of value when moving into 
the warehouse B. This idea is 
not disputed in the thesis, but it 
will be shown that such 
reasoning is counterproductive. 
Value 
Distance 
 
Warehouse B 
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something that is idiosyncratic. For example, a highly modified computer system makes the 
contractor dependent on the subcontractor, thus enabling opportunistic behavior from the latter. 
Human-specific assets are largely the same as firm-specific human capital in personnel 
economics, i.e. it is only valuable to the current firm. An often-used attribute of these assets is 
that of learning by doing. Although that is usually the way in which these assets are acquired, 
learning by doing is both unnecessary and insufficient as a descriptor. For instance, one may 
have a special set of skills which is more valuable to the current employer than for any other 
although the skills may have been acquired somewhere else – often this may be the case when 
employed by the government, i.e. the employer market for that particular set of skills is very 
thin.  
Finally, dedicated assets are such that might not be specific to a transaction per se, but 
have been acquired in order to fulfil a (prospective) contract. To continue with the warehouse 
example and assuming away the site specificity, i.e. the subcontractor may have acquired a 
warehouse which is of the general type of warehouses and in a generally preferred area. 
However, if it loses the contract it will have no use for the warehouse, resulting in large 
overcapacities. Knowing this, the contractor can negotiate the price down opportunistically 
since it knows the supplier will either have to give discount or lose the investment. 
2.1.3 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty, in terms of transaction cost economics, is divided into behavioral and 
environmental uncertainties (Williamson, 1985, pp. 56-60). There are several different 
nominations for these two, but the terms are chosen for their simplicity. The former refers to 
controlling opportunism, while the latter refers to the expected variation. 
The difficulty of controlling opportunistic behavior means mostly that the contractor 
cannot confirm the behavior of the seller. In other words, it refers to the difficulty of measuring 
the labor done by the supplier. For instance, if a firm outsources recruitment, it cannot know 
for a certainty whether the supplier actually works toward the end of finding the best 
employees, or if it does the least possible work to produce somewhat adequate candidates. 
According to Williamson (1985, p. 60), low predictability should lead to higher 
transaction costs since the contracts need to be altered accordingly. In a time of high demand, 
the opportunity cost of (spot) contracting is even higher since the entrepreneur/manager should 
have even more than usual at hand. Since an internal employee (or perhaps another asset) can 
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respond to these change more quickly, a higher level of environmental uncertainty should lead 
to lower levels of outsourcing. 
2.1.4 Frequency 
Frequency, according to Williamson (1985, p. 60) refers solely to the buyer’s activity 
in the market, and higher frequency should lead to a lower level of outsourcing. As Williamson, 
we will assume away one-off dealings for a simple reason: they are not very common in this 
context. There are thus just two types of frequencies: occasional and recurrent. Occasional 
investments (this does not refer to just investment-type acquisitions; just something a firm puts 
its money into) are such where there is very rarely need for internal organization, but it 
increases as recurrence emerges. 
The reason why outsourcing should decrease as frequency increases actually derives of 
increasing asset specificity. The logic is as follows: to achieve economies of scale, worker 
specialization must increase, and so do the idiosyncrasies as the organization’s systemic 
complexity grows due to different interrelationships between workers and tasks. (Williamson, 
1985, pp. 60-61). 
2.2 TCE – Assumptions and contracting process 
Transaction cost economics relies upon the dual behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality 
and opportunism. The following subchapters will provide an explication of each as well as 
show their implications to the contracting process. 
2.2.1 Bounded rationality 
What must be Williamson’s favorite quote should be used here: bounded rationality means that 
humans are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1957). In terms of the 
transaction cost theory this means that in some cases contracting becomes impossible since 
every possible event cannot be fathomed out even if both of the parties would desire it. Since 
contracts are drafted by humans, bounded rationality must always be assumed by definition. 
However, this is not necessarily a problem – incomplete contracting is not an issue when there 
is no risk for opportunistic behavior. 
2.2.2 Opportunism 
Opportunism, as Williamson (1985, p. 30) puts it, is “a condition of self-interest seeking with 
guile”. The guilefulness is what differentiates opportunism with regular self-interest of the 
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Smithian tradition. That is, in the traditional sense a great amount of perfect knowledge is 
expected, but in opportunistic behavior some information is not fairly disclosed, thus perverting 
the trade. For transactions, the condition of opportunism means that the parties of each 
transaction must protect themselves from opportunistic behavior: they do not need to assume 
opportunism, but not acknowledging the risk thereof would be naïve. 
Protection against opportunism can naturally be achieved through contracts. A carefully 
planned contract, that is, one that stipulates contingencies for all possible events, can give 
protection against opportunism. 
It should also be stressed that opportunism is, alongside asset specificity, the most 
important concept of TCE: Williamson (1993) states that opportunism is a requirement for non-
market contracting and governance.  
2.2.3 Contracting process 
The transaction cost paradigm revolves around the contract. Indeed, Williamson (1985, p. 41) 
posits that: “Any problem that can be posed directly or indirectly as a contracting problem is 
usefully investigated in transaction cost economizing terms.” Williamson (1985, p. 31) shows 
the proper contracting processes under each set of behavioral assumptions in the form depicted 
below. 
Table 2-2: Assumptions and contracting process. Adapted from Williamson (1985, p. 31). 
Behavioural assumption Implied contracting process 
Bounded rationality Opportunism Asset specificity  
0 + + Planning 
+ 0 + Promise 
+ + 0 Competition 
+ + + Governance 
 
 
The reader is reminded that one must always assume both bounded rationality and 
opportunism. This leads to a simple conclusion: the first two processes, planning and promise, 
do not work. Planning will not work due to the nature of humans: we are quite simply incapable 
of taking every possible event into account. Then again, sketching an incomplete contract in 
the manner of “you do the best you can and we pay you fairly”, i.e. both parties promising to 
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do their part, will not work since there is always the risk that over time one of the parties 
decides not to live up to their promise. 
Following this thought there is a simple heuristic to follow: if an asset is not specific, 
subject whatever is being contracted to competition. If asset specificity is to be assumed, look 
for governance. 
Competition can be achieved under the classical, or discrete, contracting. Under 
competition, or market governance, there is no specific preference of partners: either party can 
do business with the other or decline irrespective of whether they have done business in the 
past or not. 
Governance is somewhat trickier and can be achieved by using three different 
contracting schemata: trilateral, bilateral, or unified governance. The trilateral governance is 
an amplified form of market governance, one where the latter is supported by a pre-nominated 
arbitrator, and it is best suited for occasional transactions. The trilateral governance ought to 
be used in cases where there is some asset specificity, but due to the occasional nature of 
transactions, a bilateral or unified models would prove too costly. 
Bilateral contracts then again are binding for both parties, irrespective of whether the 
other party holds their end (unless of course some action on behalf of one party is a precondition 
to another by the other). In terms of TCE, bilateral contracts are useful in mixed-specific and 
recurrent cases. This would be the case where some continuity is generally preferable, but the 
transaction costs are not extremely high. 
Finally, unified governance is the type used under an integrated process, that is, where 
the decision is made to make and not buy something due to high risks of opportunism because 
of asset specificity. This type of contracting, since markets are always preferred to integration, 
is mostly useful within the domain of idiosyncratic or highly specific services or goods, and 
especially in the case of recurrent ones, but also in some occasional acquisitions. An example 
of the latter type would be the manufacturing of some highly technical piece of equipment for 
which the drafting of the contract and even searching for able subcontractors would force high 
transaction costs. 
2.3 Outsourcing from the perspective of the TCE 
This subchapter is something of a summary from the previous two subchapters, and the reason 
to include this is to enable the non-specialized reader to capture the idea of transaction cost 
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economics in its entirety (or rather, in terms of outsourcing) as the previous chapters deal with 
the TCE-related concepts one by one. A further point of the chapter is to outline the economics 
which this thesis intends to challenge. 
A repetition first. Assume there is a new service or a good, a pre-existing one that has 
changed (or is about to), or transaction costs have changed; in any case, there is some service 
or good that a firm must acquire. (It is assumed that prior to the change the firm was optimized 
in terms of TCE.) According to the theory, everything is by default acquired from the market 
and stronger modes of governance are only necessary when transaction costs occur. These costs 
were listed in 2.1.1, but what they are is somewhat irrelevant because they are unmeasurable 
at the time. 
These costs, however, would not be an issue without the dual assumptions of the TCE. 
These assumptions are those of bounded rationality and opportunism. The former means that 
those costs cannot be contracted away by making fool-proof contracts, and the latter means 
that people tend to (or at least might) seek self-interest guilefully and thus one would need 
those fool-proof contracts. So, the solution is either integration (or insourcing) or a contract 
that holds stronger than a regular market contract, but nevertheless maintains the separation of 
the supplier and the buyer as legal entities. However, to keep things simple, these non-standard 
contracts are assumed away, and sourcing is a binary make-or-buy decision. 
Since bounded rationality and opportunism are always assumed to be present, the 
solution with which the proper mode of governance is selected can be estimated through 
proxies which are uncertainty (the difficulty to estimate the exact demand and the difficulty to 
evaluate the subcontractor’s performance), frequency (how much/often does the contractor 
require these goods or services), and most importantly, asset specificity. 
An asset can be specific in a number of ways (listed in 2.1.2), but the important thing – 
what makes an asset specific – is that an asset is specific in the case where the asset has more 
value in the current or proposed transaction than if that asset would be put to any other use. 
The below figure depicts the relationship between production costs, governance costs, 
and asset specificity. As an asset becomes increasingly specific, the production cost between 
internal and external production decreases since the production becomes more idiosyncratic, 
but ΔC is only ever assumed to converge toward zero, meaning external production is never 
assumed to be more expensive in terms of production costs. Then again, as the asset specificity 
increases, ΔG or the difference of governance costs between outsourcing and integrated 
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organization does become negative. Since the former converges to zero and the latter becomes 
negative, the total cost of integration also becomes negative, i.e. integration becomes more 
economical than outsourcing. This is basically the bottom line of outsourcing in light of TCE. 
 
Figure 2-2: Costs as functions of asset specificity 
  
Asset specificity aside, the theory goes that uncertainty and frequency should also be 
inversely correlated with outsourcing. Uncertainty is divided into two: behavioral and 
environmental uncertainties which require interaction with asset specificity. That is, it does not 
matter if measuring output is difficult or if the expected volatility is high since it is easy to go 
to the market and buy from another party. 
In terms of frequency, it was already explained that increasing frequency causes 
increasing asset specificity. Thus, because both uncertainty depends on asset specificity and 
frequency causes it, the above position that asset specificity is the bottom line is well justified. 
2.4 Other theories used in this thesis 
This chapter will take a look at two competence-based views of organization as well as two 
theories regarding contracts and the interplay between firms. The reason why these theories are 
presented is that they are referred to several times in this thesis and they offer views alternative 
to TCE.  
ΔG 
ΔC 
ΔC+ΔG 
Cost as a function of asset 
specificity. ΔC depicts the 
difference between production 
costs at the market and in the 
firm. ΔG depicts the difference 
between governance cost at the 
market and in the firm. 
Combining the two, it becomes 
increasingly cheaper to make 
rather than buy as asset 
specificity increases. (Adapted 
from Williamson, 1981, p. 560) 
Cost 
Asset specificity 
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The resource-based view and the core competencies theory are the competence-based 
theories (and will be referred that way later), and they are also mostly concerned with what 
types of resources should be outsourced. Unsurprisingly, both theories have also been coupled 
with TCE to create combinatory views which just goes on to show that one rather simple theory 
cannot answer all the questions in a complex world, no matter how good it would be. These 
two theories are jointly referred to as competence-based theories. 
The two other theories are agency theory and game theory. The former discusses the 
asymmetry between the agent and the principal, and is paramount to understanding especially 
the implicit effects of contracting. Game theory is hugely important in this thesis: if Williamson 
claims that before his theory, nonstandard contracting was poorly understood, it is likewise 
with game theory before which there was poor understanding of how firms’ actions affect the 
actions of other firms. It is in fact quite incredible that the whole body of Williamson’s work 
barely notices the existence of game theory. 
2.4.1 The resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, originating around the same time as the TCE, 
states that a firm can achieve competitive advantage through its resources. What gives the 
resources potential for sustained competitive advantage is that these resources are “valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable” (Barney, 1991) or VRIN, as the commonly used 
acronym goes. Also, Crook et al. (2008) found that RBV is strongly supported by the data. 
The difference between TCE and RBV, according to Conner (1991), is that the TCE 
has the sole purpose of avoiding negative impacts while the RBV sees the firm as a collection 
of resources. Thus, Conner and Prahalad (1996) argue that even though there would be no 
threat of opportunism, some activities should be organized internally. The latter point is proven 
to be correct by Bylund (2015). 
McIvor (2009) argues on ground of several studies – and develops a framework – that 
in essence furthers the idea that the RBV and the TCE are in fact complementary, that is, 
understanding of both theories is necessary, and not one of them completely explains 
outsourcing. 
2.4.2 The theory of core competencies 
The core competencies theory by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggests that focusing on these 
core competencies is the key, and that the rest are potential candidates for outsourcing. The 
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core competencies are such that fulfil three criteria: they have multiple potential uses, are seen 
important by customers buying the end products, and they are difficult to imitate. 
Clearly, core competencies are specific assets, but they are equally clearly different 
things. Indeed, core competencies are more complex than specific assets. Core competencies 
are something that provide for fitness, and since they are good for multiple uses, they in fact 
enable the company to look for other fitness peaks instead of fighting tooth and nail for the 
current one which is the destiny under TCE. 
Arnold (2000) has developed a model which integrates the two theories. However, the 
model does not really seem to take core competencies as a whole, but rather views the model 
as a something of a linear function for asset specificity – something I obviously disagree with. 
Basically the idea is to inject the short-term TCE with the long-term nature of core 
competencies, but they are not quite so compatible. Still, the idea is clear and points to the fact 
that a single theory is unable to answer everything. 
2.4.3 Agency theory 
The core of agency theory, as stated before, is at the contract, meaning the theory does not 
explicitly state which processes should be outsourced, but is more interested in the (a)symmetry 
of interests. In essence, agency theory discusses the issues that arise due to different incentives 
for the principal (contractor) and agent (supplier). 
The agency theory shares many features with transaction cost economics, as pointed out 
by Eisenhardt (1989), but they have distinctive features also. For me, agency theory provides 
valuable insights because I do not believe firm boundaries have much to do with either 
opportunism or bounded rationality. TCE is interested in firm boundaries, agency theory only 
in (the payoff of) the contract. This is an important division since TCE does not fully take into 
account that payoffs can remain similar whether or not the (human) asset is integrated. 
2.4.4 Game theory 
Game theory studies strategic decision making, and it has some similarity with agency theory 
in that both study situations where there are two parties who try to choose what is best for them. 
The difference between the two is that agency theory is interested in the agent-principal 
problem which means in essence the asymmetry of interests (and ways to overcome it), 
whereas game theory is interested in finding out which course of action is best for each side. 
Thus, agency theory is related to the transaction, and game theory is related to opportunism. 
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Williamson (2007, p. 5) posits that there are similarities with game theory and TCE, 
but that "TCE nevertheless differs in that contractual incompleteness sets in as the limits on 
rationality become binding in relation to transactional complexity" and that "TCE views 
governance as a means by which to relieve the oppressive logic of 'bad games'." Neither of 
these views are agreed with in this thesis. While contractual incompleteness sets in, it is of 
strategic benefit for both parties to co-operate which is obvious when games are played 
iteratively (see chapter 4.4.1 for more details). In turn, bad games (like prisoner's dilemma) can 
also be averted by co-operation.  
For instance, in prisoner's dilemma the best strategy for each side is to be opportunistic, 
meaning neither has anything to gain by co-operating. But in such situations the game can be 
rigged by introducing rewards and penalties for certain behavior, regardless of boundaries. In 
fact, as we will see in chapter 4.4.1, the rewards and penalties underlie any transaction even if 
they are not stated explicitly. 
2.5 Complexity 
While the study of complex systems stems from mathematics and natural sciences, it today is 
a cross-disciplinary field gaining momentum in social sciences as well; indeed, complexity is 
rather a framework or a paradigm according to which science is made than it is a discipline as 
such, although “complexics” has been suggested as a discipline (Bastardas i Boada, 2015) 
(perhaps as a stunt to raise awareness to complexity).  
 As such, complexity both challenges and does not challenge the reductionist science 
(reductionism and linearity are equal here). Reductionist science has successfully helped us 
identify the components that are interwoven into complex systems, and the study of complex 
systems does not deny that, for instance, substances consist of atoms. However, reductionist 
science runs into problems when it tries to describe complex behavior using linear models, and 
here the language and techniques of complexity studies might be able to help. In other words, 
each of them has a role to play, but often times we have been stuck with using reductionist 
methods with complex systems, not vice versa. 
 This may partly explain why completely different takes on outsourcing, such as RBV 
and TCE, are both somewhat useful guides (and why a combination is better than either alone). 
The problem is, as Bastardas i Boada (2015) points out, not that we need better simplistic, 
linear models, but that we should be able to create theory based on complexity. 
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 Complexity is notoriously difficult to define. Johnson (2009, p. 3) defines complexity 
science to be “the study of the phenomena that emerge from a collection of interacting objects”. 
While this is a good definition, it does not exactly help us understand complex systems. Instead, 
a usual (and better) approach is to describe those phenomen, or in other words the features that 
complex systems generally possess. The aim of this subchapter is to list those features. 
2.5.1 Features of complex systems 
The first necessary feature of any complex system is that it has a large number of parts. Large 
is obviously a relative measure, but it needs to be large enough that establishing clear links 
becomes difficult. Three is the absolute minimum, but in general the amounts tend to pile up 
because the systems are open. For instance, medical issues are difficult because it may be 
difficult to understand whether the reason is that A causes B or A causes C and D which in turn 
cause B. Point being, if A cannot be controlled, it could still be possible to control B by 
controlling C and D. Recent interest in epigenetics could be named as an exciting example. 
 Complexity emerges from those parts, meaning simple parts can form a complex whole 
(although the parts can be complex too, and in general it depends on the level of interest 
whether the parts are complex or not). Emergent behavior is the phenomenon where the 
behavior of the system is not understood from the behavior of its constituents. It is worth noting 
that this does not mean that the parts would not determine the whole; to paraphrase Lorenz 
(2005), the parts determine the whole, but the approximate parts do not approximately 
determine the whole. 
 An example of this could be such that an organization outsourced one of its processes, 
faced opportunistic behavior, and then re-engineered the process entirely, thus integrating the 
specific part and outsourcing the non-specific part. With the benefit of the hindsight, it is 
obvious that re-engineering was caused by opportunism and opportunism was enabled by the 
outsourcing as well as caused by the agent, but there is nothing particularly re-engineeringly 
about anyone of the parties. 
 Interaction or interdependence of different parts is another one of the most important 
features of all complex system studies. Interdependence means just that the parts are 
interconnected and so if something happens to one of those parts it elicits a response from the 
other parts as well. For instance, there has been much controversy during the euro crisis 
whether to pump more debt into already indebted economies or take a more austere approach 
and heavily cut back on spending. Some people claim that the former will only push them over 
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the edge into default, others say that the latter will paralyze the economy. Both are, at least to 
some extent, correct. 
 Interaction obviously relates to feedback and feedback loops. Feedback means that 
there are mechanisms which feed information back into the system, and feedback comes in two 
flavors, positive (amplifying) and negative (dampening). Their names can be somewhat 
deceitful, since often positive loops are negative, and vice versa. For instance, bubbles and 
consequent crashes in the stock markets are caused by positive loops and the price mechanism 
is a negative loop. Sometimes the feedback systems have numerous parts, which lead to an 
obvious conclusion made by Åström and Murray (2008, p. 1): “This makes reasoning based on 
cause and effect tricky, and it is necessary to analyze the system as a whole.” 
 Feedback systems (that is, all complex systems) can also be open and closed. The latter 
are such where the feedback signals stay within the system. For instance, a car’s cruise control 
is a closed system; non-technically, it takes the speed from the speedometer and when the car 
slows down, it accelerates until the speedo hits the target, and vice versa for speeding up and 
braking. The system is not interested about external disturbances, although they affect the 
speed. An open system, then again, has boundaries like a closed one (although showing them 
clearly is difficult, perhaps even impossible), but it both affects and is affected by its 
surroundings. Businesses are obviously open systems: they both affect and are effected by the 
economic forces, employees come and go, and so on.  
  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Closed (above) and open feedback systems 
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 Nonlinearity is another important feature of complex systems. Emergence, 
interdependence, and feedbacks are obviously to blame for it. In essence, it just means that the 
system violates the superposition principle: 
 𝑓(𝛼𝑥 + 𝛽𝑦) = 𝛼𝑓(𝑥) + 𝛽𝑓(𝑦). (1) 
 What the superposition principle means in normal people language is that the function 
(or system) is equal to the sum of its parts, thus making it linear. The violation thereof, 
naturally, means that the function is not equal to the sum of its parts which in turn means that 
a change here might not result to an expected change there. Obviously, this makes estimation 
difficult and often nonlinear systems are linearized, as is the case with TCE and organizations 
where the TCE is a linear approximation of nonlinear organizations. Needless to say, this leads 
to some wrong conclusions. 
 Sensitive dependence to initial conditions, or more commonly known as the butterfly 
effect, is an example where the linear approximations fail. The term means just that small 
changes can have large impacts in the future. Thus, the system is sensitive to the initial 
conditions. 
 The classic example of this is the weather. The often-told story goes that the father of 
the effect Edward Lorenz was doing weather forecasts, and since it was the 1960s, the computer 
could not save any data. So, Lorenz had to re-input the numbers from a printout, and instead 
of the precise number in six decimals, he saved some time by typing only the three first. One 
would think that such a shortcut could not possibly have a large effect, but that is how the 
simulation turned out. As Lorenz (1963, p. 431) himself put it: “One meteorologist remarked 
that if the theory were correct, one flap of a sea gull's wings would be enough to alter the course 
of the weather forever. The controversy has not yet been settled, but the most recent evidence 
seems to favor the sea gulls.” 
In terms of business this could mean the following: consider there are two competitors 
for a market, called A and B. A is TCE-optimized and thus its production cost is $1.2, while B 
naively trusts its suppliers and makes the same product for $1.1. Both want 25% margins, so 
final prices are $1.6 and $1.47. Now, the demand is price elastic, so B sells 1000 pieces and A 
sells just 100. Thus, B makes $370 and A makes $40. However, the investment required to 
start production is $100, so A will not enter the market or it will make a big loss. Now B invests 
those $370 into R&D and comes up with a great product that it can make for $1.3 and sell for 
$3, and so on. And all of this is because of a dime.  
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 Complex systems are said to be far from equilibrium. When systems are isolated 
(which they never are, but often that is a useful assumption) they tend toward equilibrium 
which is the state of non-changing of variables. Far from equilibrium then obviously means 
that the variables are changing. When a system is far from equilibrium, it can be forced toward 
equilibrium, but that takes energy and energy comes at a cost. In terms of business, this energy 
is of course labor and the cost is money. Thus, an organization must be able to come up with 
that money if it intends to remain in equilibrium. Also, it is quite likely that these costs will 
increase exponentially. The other option is of course allowing change and uncertainty. This 
thesis views that TCE is something with which to force equilibrium, and that too much search 
for harmony will kill the organization. Instead, organizations should embrace uncertainty and 
adapt as necessary. 
 Complex systems sometimes also possess the ability to self-organize which means that 
organizations, groups, etc. are formed without an intelligent designer or a leader. Indeed, even 
one of the lowliest animals of this planet, the army ant, is capable of putting on one of the most 
awesome shows known: in the hundreds of thousands, these blind and unknowing insects create 
massive legions that kill everything in their way, and form magnificently strong fortresses to 
protect their queen and larvae (Mitchell, 2011, p. 3). Unsurprisingly, the army ants (like other 
flocking and swarming animals) have been fascinating the students of complex system for a 
long time. This is also relevant for organizations consisting of somewhat more intelligent 
creatures, such as businesspeople, and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 There are just two features left to be presented that were deemed important in order to 
understand complexity in organizations. However, the two are extremely important – perhaps 
the most important ones. 
 The first of these is adaptation. It is very, very important for living systems, and often 
the studies of these systems are found under a separate title, complex adaptive systems (CAS). 
I did not wish to make this separation although organizations are clearly CAS. Adaptation 
simply means that these complex systems are able to change individual and collective behavior 
in order to respond to changes in their environments. The thesis views that TCE does not 
recognize this behavior: the point is not to be economical about a task, but to be able to change 
the task if need be. 
 Finally, the bottom-line question: how do species survive and businesses thrive? It is 
the survival of the fittest, and the idea of fitness can be depicted by fitness landscapes. Fitness 
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is obviously a more-less question, and a fitness landscape is reminiscent of a landscape with 
peaks and valleys, the former depicting better fitness and the latter poorer fitness.  
The reason to mention fitness landscapes is that they help us understand the idea that 
doing business is not simplistic. Obviously, the fitness landscape cannot be depicted in this 
case (it is an n-dimensional landscape, and even if it was reduced to three dimensions, the exact 
locations of peaks would be impossible to tell).  
However, we are able to speak of the nature of the landscape. How high and wide are 
the peaks, i.e. is the difference between one strategy and another huge in terms of fitness, and 
how exactly do you have to hit that peak? How rugged or flat is the terrain, i.e. are there many 
peaks? Is the landscape quite static or extremely dynamic (in business, the landscape is never 
static per se, but it can be expected to be static for a certain amount of time), i.e. is efficiency 
or agility more important? 
To summarize, the features are listed in the below table. The explanations have been 
kept as simple and as short as possible in order to help the non-technical reader capture the idea 
of complex systems. 
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Table 2-3: Features of complex systems 
Feature Explanation 
Many parts All complex systems have many parts. They are needed in order 
for there to be any interactions. 
Emergence Complexity emerges from those parts. That means that the way 
in which the system behaves cannot be readily understood by 
knowing the parts. 
Interaction or 
interdependence 
The parts must interact with each other so that the behavior can 
be complex. If they do not interact, the system will be simple. 
Feedback The system learns about the results of its actions and the learned 
information affects the system’s next action. Positive feedback 
loops amplify the effects and negative ones dampen them. 
Nonlinearity The effect an input has on the system is not easily understood. 
An input may have no effect, a small effect, a linear effect, or 
even extremely large effects on the system. 
Sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions 
A small change can have a large effect (see: non-linearity) if the 
circumstances are such that the small change can lead to a phase 
transition. 
Far from equilibrium The properties of the system are changing constantly. As 
opposed to equilibrium where nothing changes. 
Self-organization The system (e.g. a group of people) does not need to have a 
designated director in order for it to organize so that it can better 
accomplish some tasks. 
Adaptation The ability of systems and their parts to change individual and 
collective behavior in order to respond to changing needs. 
Fitness and fitness 
landscapes 
Fitness tells us just how well (in this case) the organization is 
suited to the task. The landscape is a depiction of how different 
strategies relate to each other. 
 
 
  
 Review of empirical and literal findings 
 
 26  
 
3 Review of empirical and literal findings 
Referring to the empirical findings on the title, this chapter goes through some of the empirical 
work done with transaction cost economics. Literal findings, then again, refer mostly to the 
complexity side of things: these are further developments of the theory regarding the complex 
nature of our world. However, this is a short chapter because going into too much detail about 
the empirical findings is fairly pointless. The point of this chapter is to first show that TCE is 
not unquestionable, and then to show some developments from the complex systems for later 
use. 
3.1 Studies on transaction cost economics 
TCE is an empirical success story – – research has been broadly 
corroborative of the predictions of transaction cost economics. 
(Williamson, 2000, 605-607) 
There have been hundreds of studies of outsourcing where transaction cost economics has been 
used as the theoretical background, either on its own or in conjunction with others. Since this 
study is not a literary review, all of them will not be explored. Instead, a few meta-studies are 
reviewed, and also a couple of regular ones to make a few points. While the findings are 
discussed here, their implications will mostly be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Everaert et al. (2010) studied how the transaction cost theory explains the outsourcing 
of accounting in Belgian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The study was originally 
extremely interesting since the study was meant to be about Finnish SMEs and their accounting 
– and TCE. So, very similar indeed. The reason why the study is very relevant even now is that 
SMEs are the backbone of all capitalist economies; financial sector aside, 499 out of 500 
enterprises were SMEs, and they accounted for two thirds of all jobs and more than a half of 
total value added in EU in 2013 (Muller et al., 2014, p. 10). 
 The authors’ work was a prime example of outsourcing in regard of TCE. They 
hypothesized that asset specificity, both types of uncertainty, and frequency would all correlate 
inversely with the level of outsourcing. To keep the story short, the hypotheses on asset 
specificity and frequency held, whereas those on uncertainty did not. 
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 However, these results have a lot to do with how they are measured and not just what 
is really going on. Asset specificity holds on firm level, that is, the higher the firm thinks of the 
specificity, the less it outsources. On the other hand, on the task level things turn on their head: 
the simple task of invoice entry was outsourced only in 8% of the cases while for the more 
specific tasks of period-end and financial statements the shares of outsourcing far exceeded 
one third and a half, respectively. 
Indeed, this could be explained by TCE in the following manner: invoice entry has a 
higher frequency so it is integrated; the statements are done more infrequently so they are 
outsourced. However, the same could be equally well explained by competence or resources: 
the firms that do not have experienced accountants must outsource the more difficult 
accounting tasks whereas the entrepreneur’s teenage child can do the invoice entry cheaply and 
efficiently. Since Everaert et al. (2010) also found that the CEO’s skills correlated inversely 
with outsourcing, this is quite a reasonable assumption to be made. Thus, perhaps transaction 
cost economics explained nothing much at all, but instead happened to coincide with the fact 
that the firms use whatever resources they have at hand and outsource the rest. This will be 
returned to shortly. 
Ang and Straub (1998) studied the outsourcing of information systems among the 
banking industry in the United States. They found that both production cost and transaction 
cost economizing took place, and also that firm size correlated inversely with outsourcing. The 
important point of their study is that production cost savings were seen important by a factor 
of six to one compared to transaction cost savings. This point is taken up later on. 
 Now, for the meta-studies. Alaghehband et al. (2011) conducted one in which they 
found that out of 25 TCE outsourcing studies, just nine found definitive support for the theory, 
and eleven – almost a half of them – found results that were either insignificant or contrary to 
the theory. The rest were mixed. Furthermore, if the dependent variable was the decision to 
outsource, the results were even worse for TCE. 
 Lacity et al. (2011) conducted another meta-study with similar results. In the 31 studies 
that they included there were in total 73 TCE constructs. They were split exactly in the middle: 
36 supported TCE, 37 did not. Especially concerning for TCE is that asset specificity, which 
is by far the most important variable, was supported only in twelve out of thirty-three occasions, 
that is, just over once in three. 
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 For both the Lacity et al. (2011) and Alaghehband (2011), the decisions to outsource 
were slightly less supported than the outcomes. This could indicate that while TCE is not used 
by the companies, perhaps it should. In fact, I do not disagree with this analysis: any theory 
that offers another point of view to be considered can be beneficial. 
 A prior study to the aforementioned sister studies was conducted David and Han (2004). 
In it, the authors performed more than 300 statistical tests from 63 articles which they chose 
very conservatively, that is, “selecting only published journal articles with clear and direct 
relevance to TCE” (ibid. p.51), and the support found was in the usual range: 47%.  
Carter and Hodgson (2006) studied TCE with a critical twist, and they found similar 
support (and lack thereof) for TCE as the other theories. What is interesting in their study is 
that they point out two important facts that seem to go without much regard in other studies. 
First, one of the most important features of TCE, especially in this day and age, human asset 
specificity could well be explained by other theories, namely those that stress competence. 
Second, without the ability to measure transaction costs, other theories could more accurately 
predict behavior and outcomes even when TCE is supported. 
Alaghehband et al. (2011) and David and Han (2004) take a more apologetic view: they 
claim that this contradiction between the theory and the results are due to poorly designed 
studies, that the theory has been “misappropriated” (e.g. Alaghehband et al., 2011, p. 126). 
That is, the reason why TCE is not supported by empirical studies is that the studies have not 
been properly designed. Perhaps so, but if the TCE is too difficult to grasp in order to be 
properly appropriated, then is it really a flaw of the scientists and not the theory? And if so, 
why is the theory not fixed, that is, why is it not operationalized by someone in a way that 
produces the results the theory predicts? 
 While Lacity et al. (2011) do not exactly disagree – perhaps out of courtesy – with 
Alaghehband et al. (2011), that is, they feel that TCE could be developed further to better 
explain IT outsourcing (ITO), they also write that: “However, we would argue that there are 
sufficient mixed results with applying TCE to studying IT outsourcing to suggest that other 
work may be even more important.” (p. 151). Indeed, their abstract says it well: “We argue that 
we are asking too much of TCE—the ITO phenomenon is more complex than can be 
accommodated by TCE.” (p. 139). To state the obvious, I agree, and I would also extend that 
to other areas than IT, too. 
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 To summarize, the research on TCE is broadly mixed, not corroborative, and even when 
the theory is corroborated, it can quite well be explained by other theories as well. I believe 
this questions the validity of TCE. It could be that TCE does not hold, or that it is not used 
properly. Whether one takes the latter, apologetic view or the former, critical view, I believe 
one thing is a certainty: Williamson’s quote that opened this subchapter must be taken with a 
pinch of salt. That is, to say that the jury is still very much out on TCE would probably be 
overly cautious, and on those grounds it is clear that TCE can be questioned. 
3.2 Findings from complex system studies and literature 
Bylund (2015) is thus far the only one I know of that has studied TCE with the methods that 
can help us understand complexity. In particular, he used agent-based modelling (ABM), a type 
of simulation, to test for Coasean transaction cost propositions. What the article shows is that 
propositions “high transaction costs cause integration” (P1) and “low transaction costs (and 
entrepreneurship) do not cause firms to form” (P3b) were not supported. 
To put it mildly, this largely turns transaction cost economics on its head. As Bylund 
summarizes, Coasean transaction costs are neither sufficient nor necessary in explaining why 
firms are formed. If firms are not increasingly formed with transaction costs or decreasingly 
without them, what drives firm formation? Bylund shows that it is innovation. After all, it 
makes sense: if there is one player who can outpace all the others, then it is better to join that 
player than to wither away. Co-operation offers comparative advantage to players far beyond 
any reasonable scares of opportunism. 
However, Bylund (2015) does establish a link between the effect of transaction costs 
and specialization. This might implicate that the idea of asset specificity is of high importance. 
But another finding suggests that it is actually not: Madhok (1996) points out that lower 
transaction costs lead to lower profit for agents within organizations, a finding Bylund also 
refers to. This point is interesting, and relates to an underlying idea I have about transaction 
cost economics not explaining anything at all, at least when humans are considered. That is, 
completely regardless of the boundaries, in a linear setting there are (if there are) opportunistic 
tendencies when asset specificity is high. An employee is largely free to change jobs, and thus 
highly specialized workers can use their specific skills to demand higher wages – or leave. 
Moving on to a completely different type of finding, the Taleb quadrants, as they are 
often referred to (Kenett and Tapiero, 2009), are another look at the risk quadrants. 
Traditionally, risk has been divided into four quadrants according to their probabilities and 
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impacts (high/low for each). However, Taleb (2008) uses another classification: probability 
distribution and payoff complexity. 
Table 3-1: Taleb quadrants 
 Simple payoffs Complex payoffs 
Type 1 or thin tails Q1 Q3 
Type 2 or fat-tailed/unknown Q2 Q4 
 
It might be helpful to explain the effect of probability distributions. For example, a 
normal distribution (that takes the shape of a bell curve when drawn) is one in which the 
deviation from the mean is exponentially rare. For instance, the 68-95-99.7 rule states that 68% 
of the observations are within one standard deviation, 95% are within two, and 99.7% are 
within three standard deviations.  
An example is IQ: the mean is 100, and there are several different standard deviations 
used, most common of which is 15. So for instance, only 0.3% of the population have an IQ of 
higher than 145 or lower than 55. The limit for Mensa is that you belong in the highest 2% so 
you need to exceed 130 (95% are within two standard deviations so half of the rest are outside 
and in the above half). Because the rarity increases exponentially, six standard deviations out 
happens only in about one case in 500 million. Thus, there are about 160 million people in the 
world that could get into Mensa, but only about seven people whose IQ exceeds 190. So 
extreme cases are extremely rare. 
However, for fat-tailed distributions this does not hold. Money is an excellent example. 
The mean wealth of a family in the U.S. has been around $500,000 for some time, and the 
standard deviation is in the same range. Thus, if wealth was normally distributed, there would 
be about one family in the United States whose wealth exceeds seven times that, or $3.5M. 
This is obviously not the case. There are, in fact, hundreds of families whose wealth exceeds 
that by seven thousand times or more. There are, in fact, a few individuals whose wealth 
exceeds that by seventy thousand times.  
For most businesses, this is not relevant, but for some, it is very much so. Especially 
those who work with money, that is, in the financial sector. Mentally, however, it is relevant 
for others, too. For instance, if a company is relying on one big customer, its historical variation 
of order amounts does not reveal the true risk. If standard deviation has been, say, 50 units and 
mean is 1000 units per month, and the one big customer is half of that, it should realize that the 
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likelihood of dropping to less than 700 is not one in five hundred million months (or one in 40 
million years), i.e. something that does not need to be taken into account. Indeed, the triple-A 
credit rating signifies a 0.2% default probability annually so even that means it will happen 
once every 500 years meaning it is 80 thousand times more probable than the bell curve 
suggests. Likely, however, the issues are related to market problems: for instance, Nokia’s sales 
of mobile phones went from 450 million in 2010 to 250 million in 2013, whereas iPhone sales 
soared from 40 million to 150 million. The parts used were different, so clearly this has had a 
large effect on the suppliers. What are the odds? 1%? 2%? 5%? It is a million times more than 
a bell curve predicts. 
The Taleb quadrants are described in the following way. In the first quadrant, the 
payoffs are either binary or of a small range, such as heads/tails or a person’s weight. This 
quadrant works very well with statistics: distributions follow models (e.g. Gaussian or Poisson 
distributions), and the variance-based expected value models are easily used. 
The second quadrant is characterized by events that are extremely rare and usually 
binary. While the tail events can be catastrophic, they are usually quite simply protected against 
by using insurance (and by not being a sucker, to use Taleb’s wording). For instance, houses 
do not burn down that often, but they do, sometimes, and when it happens, it can be disastrous 
– unless the house was insured (assuming there was no-one inside). 
The third quadrant is somewhat messier than the first quadrant since the outcomes are 
complex, but here the statistical methods work quite well also. Because the distribution is 
merciful, that is, extreme events are extremely rare, it is quite possible to build in enough 
resilience and redundancy into the system: for instance, a human body is very complex indeed, 
but it is resilient because it can heal itself and adapt – and speaking of redundancy, it comes 
with a replacement kidney. 
The fourth quadrant is the danger zone, or “Black Swan domain” (Taleb, 2008, p. 8). 
The tail events are more common than the variance-based distributions would suggest, and the 
outcomes are complex, even chaotic. The classic example of this is leveraged finance, Taleb’s 
own field, where the agents are strongly interconnected. As a heavily leveraged company goes 
down after just a few percentage points’ drop, its interrelations can bring down the next one, 
even further increasing the odds of the one after that failing as well, possibly causing a 
cascading failure of the markets.  
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Normal businesses are generally speaking in the third quadrant, or between the third 
and the fourth. They need to make complex decisions and they are interconnected to other 
actors, but because they are not heavily leveraged, they can often endure quite a lot of beating 
before collapsing. 
Moving on to complexity within organizations and to one of the most important sources 
of inspiration for this thesis: Ralph D. Stacey’s book Complexity and Creativity in 
Organizations (1996) explains in detail the complex processes that take place in organizations. 
The important take home message for the understanding of this thesis is the 
understanding of dual networks. Stacey (1996) posits that organizations have two networks, 
the legitimate network and the shadow network. The former is described by Stacey (1996, p. 
24-26) in the following manner: 
The first type of network –– consists of links that are either (1) formally and intentionally 
established by the most powerful members of an organization or (2) established by well-
understood, implicit principles that are widely accepted by members of the organization 
– that is, a shared culture or accepted ideology. –– These links –– establish the nature 
and direction of the authority and responsibility of each individual agent in relation to 
others and to the primary task; in doing so the links constitute a legitimate network 
system consisting of a hierarchy, a bureaucracy, and an approved ideology. –– The links 
in the legitimate system are linear in the sense that: one and only one response is 
permitted for any given stimulus; any outputs are proportional to inputs; the system is 
not more or less than the sum of its parts. –– The boundary of this legitimate system is 
clear-cut: either particular agents are members of the system or they are not. 
Furthermore its purpose is clear and relatively easily understood: it is to perform the 
current primary tasks of the organization so that the organization survives. 
The legitimate network, then, is what could be described as the traditional view of the 
organization: it describes who does what, how things are done, and who has power over whom. 
In essence, it is a clockwork-like view of the organization: it describes how the proverbial gears 
are set, and expects that certain inputs here lead to certain outputs there.  
The shadow network, unsurprisingly, is quite different (Stacey, 1996, p. 26-27): 
The links are spontaneously and informally established by individual agents among 
themselves during the course of interacting in the legitimate system. The result is another 
network, a kind of shadow of the legitimate system consisting of informal social and 
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political links, in which agents develop their own local rules for interacting with each 
other in the course of that interaction. Some of those rules come to be shared in small 
groups, or even across the whole system: in other words, group and organizational 
cultures develop that are not part of the officially sanctioned culture or ideology. Other 
rules of conduct within this shadow system, however, remain specific to individual 
agents. –– These shadow rules constitute a repertoire of thoughts, perceptions, and 
behaviors that are potentially available to an organization but are not currently being 
utilized for its main purpose. Instead, the shadow system serves a myriad of other diverse 
purposes that are often quite difficult to understand. These purposes range from 
individual politicking to unofficial efforts to support or sabotage the legitimate system. 
The shadow system is quite clearly nonlinear. Many possible responses to any given 
stimulus are possible and those responses may be more or less proportional to the 
stimulus. –– Furthermore, the phenomenon of group processes, which cannot be 
explained purely in terms of the individuals present, indicates that an informal social and 
political system is more than the sum of its parts. –– In the shadow system, interactions 
take more diverse forms than is usual in the legitimate system: for example, added to 
flows of information, energy, and action are flows of emotion, friendship, trust, and other 
qualities. –– The boundaries of the shadow system are fuzzy and normally do not coincide 
with the clear-cut boundaries of the legitimate system. The shadow system extends into 
and overlaps with the shadow systems of other organizations; indeed, shadow networks 
are probably the principal route for interaction between organizations simply because 
they have sufficiently porous boundaries. 
The shadow network, to summarize, is affecting the organization, although officially not 
a part of it. It is nonlinear by definition, and as we see, other legitimate and shadow networks 
affect them, which in turn affects the organization. 
The core point here is that organizations are complex systems that have feedback 
mechanisms on all levels. Because of this, linearity cannot be expected, and because it cannot 
be expected, a linear estimation such as TCE will always be problematic. One will also see that 
these shadow networks affect behavior, for instance meaning that good relations between the 
contractor and the supplier most likely prevent opportunism. 
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4 An argument against TCE in outsourcing 
This chapter looks at transaction cost economics from the perspectives of complexity and 
economics. Every dimension and construct of TCE is addressed individually in order to point 
out where TCE may provide wrong answers. Indeed, I do not wish to claim that using 
transaction cost economics is always going to give a wrong answer, but that it will do so 
sometimes, maybe even more often than not, but not always.  
The point is that using a flawed formula should not be encouraged although it could 
sometimes give the right answer. In other words, one should not say that addition and 
multiplication are the same although 2 + 2 = 2 ∗ 2. While this is an exception, consider what 
Taleb (2010, p. 363) wrote: “When you invest, you do not care how many times you gain or 
lose, you care about the cumulative, the expectation: how many times you gain or lose times 
the amount made or lost.”  
4.1 Why firms are formed 
It is reasonable to start with the very foundation of organizations. Under the transaction cost 
economic paradigm, as set by Coase (1937, p. 390), it was argued that the primary function of 
the firm is overcoming the cost of using the price mechanism. However, this is not the case. 
Bylund (2015) shows that the primary reason why firms are formed is innovation. 
I would go on to argue that there is in fact something else that even better explains the 
formation of firms. My argument for this is based on the fact that innovations could be pursued 
even without the formation of firms (although due to legal restrictions, this is not necessarily 
the case, but theoretically so). Also, not all firms strive for innovation – some are just formed 
to support (self-)employment. I argue that the primary function of the firm is devising a legal 
entity which separates the entrepreneur and the firm. 
There are three reasons for the separation of the entrepreneur and the enterprise. The 
first reason is practicality: even if the firm would consist of only one employee and does not 
aim for growth (e.g. a self-employed accountant), it is practical to separate the person and the 
labor, i.e. what is done as an individual and what is done as a worker. This helps with 
accounting (which is useful whether or not forced by the law), for instance. 
The second reason is the divisibility of the firm. Companies that look to grow or change 
are usefully divided: the company can receive all-important funding in the early stages, or they 
can be more easily rearranged as the company switches focus and sells a part of itself or buys 
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a part of another. Conversely, a person is extremely difficult to divide. Certainly, one can sell 
shares of one’s own income, but the rest of it is impossible (and returns to the first reason). 
The third and the most important reason is risk. Or rather, it should be. A firm can take 
risks a person cannot. Or rather, should not. Consider Lloyd’s of London Names. Lloyd’s never 
went bankrupt (it is a society), but very many Names did because of the special arrangement 
Lloyd’s has used. Lloyd’s had decades earlier insured companies that faced multi-billion 
charges from people who had fallen ill (or from relatives of those who had died) from working 
around asbestos. An insurance company may have gone bankrupt, rendering investments into 
it worthless.  
But Lloyd’s works differently: the Names personally back up the insurances, in this 
case leading to catastrophic losses for many investors. Had it been a firm it would have merely 
paid what it had, and not a penny more.  The investors would have been safe, and the debtors 
left with whatever the company was able to wring out of its coffers. 
Clearly, the first two reasons can also be linked to risk. For the first part, there are two 
ways. First, someone might live financially on the edge as a person, but a personal default will 
not lead into bankruptcy for the company, and vice versa. Second, a medical doctor could make 
a mistake, but it is the MD Ltd. that faces bankruptcy after a mistreatment. Also, if the doctor 
makes a mistake, say, falls asleep driving, causing an accident, it is the doctor that is made to 
pay, but he can still practice medicine. 
On the other hand, divisibility means that if a firm sees that it needs to change strategy, 
a part of the organization can be sold and the money used to redirect the operations. This 
provides the firm with options, enabling change and thus hedging against risk. 
Technically, there are two things that risk reduction is about: fourth-quadrant risk 
reduced into third-quadrant risk, and capping the second-quadrant risk. The former refers to 
controllability of risk: because of the feedback a small perturbation that takes the system over 
the edge may (or rather, will) lead to chaos and potentially cascading failures (e.g. becoming 
heavily indebted without a house). The second-quadrant risk then again can be capped, 
stopping the cascade, and that is exactly what is done here. Losses will occur, but not 
intolerable losses. 
It is worth noting, perhaps, that the nature of risk does not change, but the firm works 
as an intermediary, and the risk that was facing the investor now faces the firm. Thus, founding 
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a firm rather than taking on an enterprise as a person gives a payoff function equal to that of 
an option compared to the one of buying stock. 
 
Figure 4-1: The firm as an option 
 
I thus believe that the transaction cost tradition answers a completely wrong question: 
transaction costs are supposedly the costs of doing business, and equal to friction. However, 
the reason to found a firm is not to overcome friction, but instead to overcome risks that would 
be otherwise intolerable. 
 The formation of groups or organizations (which develop into firms), then again, 
happens because of what Bylund (2015) showed. Innovation sets the wheels in motion, and 
there is competition in which the fittest survive (note the plural: there can be several incumbents 
with different strategies competing on the same landscape) – and fitness can be improved by 
joining forces because of the synergies.   
4.2 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity is the absolute cornerstone of the Williamsonian TCE. Opportunism and 
bounded rationality are always assumed, and thus asset specificity is what determines the mode 
of governance. I argue that this is not the case. This can be approached in two ways. First, let 
us start with the definition of asset specificity: an asset is said to be specific when it is more 
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valuable in its current use than elsewhere. The words in italics are the problem. What is the 
asset, and what does valuable mean? 
In some cases these are simple to the point of being truisms. For instance, Williamson’s 
example (1981, p. 556) of the cheek-by-jowl logic considering a blast furnace and a rolling 
mill is, as Williamson (ibid.) points out: “thought to be so ‘natural’ that alternative governance 
structures are rarely considered”. The assets are obvious (two pieces of equipment) and value 
is easily measured in money (savings in heating and transport). 
In some cases, though, it is much more difficult to understand the asset and the value. 
For instance, consider an entrepreneur, say a technically-minded innovative engineer, that has 
no idea about how to tackle the issue of accounting. For him, the asset is accounting and the 
value is you gotta do it ‘cos the law says so. The asset for the firm is thus a black box system, 
something with inputs (invoices, loan bills etc.) and outputs (reports, balance sheets, financial 
statements), but without much understanding of what happens inside the box. Although in this 
case there is specificity and behavioral uncertainty (if one does not understand accounting, the 
accountant can do quite poorly and still it may be viewed as a job well done), outsourcing is 
likely preferred. 
In another vein, let us consider someone who actually understands accounting. In that 
case, the asset can be considered labor, not accounting. In that case, the labor is thought 
specific if it is more valuable in its current use than in any other use. Clearly, it is more valuable 
if one compares accounting one’s own firm of which the entrepreneur has some knowledge 
and doing the accounting for another firm. But if one considers the labor, perhaps it is used to 
create more value added doing the core business rather than working on a support function. A 
blast furnace cannot be transformed into a helicopter effortlessly, but the operator of the furnace 
can well be an apt salesperson. 
Valuing for small businesses can also be quite difficult. Let us assume that a specialist 
can do in an hour what the entrepreneur can do in two. However, the entrepreneur can increase 
the workload without pay (the cost of the extra two hours is equal to the one hour of specialist 
work), and if there is nothing better to do, he can take over from the specialist. In this case, the 
asset needs not be specific at all in order to be integrated: the boundaries of the firm violate the 
TCE predictions. 
Let us move into a more complex territory and claim that assets and their specificities 
can change and be changed. Assets can change or be changed means that systems thinking of 
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the assets enables to view jobs, assets, and everything else in the firm more closely. Assets can 
thus be broken into parts and rearranged. This alone can lead to non-specification of certain 
assets and increasing specificity of others. 
However, changes in asset specificity refers to another thing: to the ever-changing 
sources of competitive advantage. For instance, a company might follow a strategy of 
integration because capable suppliers simply do not exist, or because interfaces are 
incompatible. Later in time, the company can switch into a modular strategy regarding the same 
product and move into other areas with integrated strategies. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) show why: when products are not good enough firms 
need to adopt a strategy of integration in order to produce the best possible product since the 
product’s performance depends greatly on the interconnections between parts. On the other 
hand, when the products are more than good enough (meaning: the level of technical 
advancements exceeds the ability of customers to adopt them) firms start to compete on 
different things; price, delivery times, etc. Value and thus specificity changes, and the changes 
can be quite rapid and violent, especially when it comes to technology. 
Because of these, assets that are valuable and specific today, can become anti-specific 
tomorrow. Since specificity means it is of more value and generality or non-specificity means 
equal value everywhere, anti-specific obviously means the asset is of less value than anywhere 
else, roughly meaning that the constellation of assets that the firm is would be better off by 
ending its operations, selling everything of any value to the highest bidder and keeping just a 
few employees to remain as a patent troll. 
4.3 Bounded rationality 
According to TCE, bounded rationality is always to be assumed. The assumption is not 
challenged, but its effect on sourcing needs some clarification. First, it is argued that bounded 
rationality is misappropriated by Williamson. Second, it will be suggested that bounded 
rationality is used, for better or for worse, but in a different way from what TCE suggests. 
Finally, the implications of limits of rationality are questioned in totality. 
Everaert et al. (2010) found, as mentioned, that economic-oriented background and 
university education are inversely correlated with outsourcing (of accounting). The only TCE 
construct that can explain this is bounded rationality. However, Williamson has somewhat 
misappropriated that term. He claims that humans are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly 
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so”, and although that is a direct quote from Simon (1957), this is not what bounded rationality 
refers to. Bounded rationality is not intended rationalism, it is knowingly limited rationalism. 
The process of decision making follows that of a rational process (i.e. establishing options and 
their payoffs and their likelihoods, then making a decision), but relies on heuristics (simplifying 
information seeking and processing, which is what Williamson means, correctly, but that is 
only a part of the larger picture) and simplifying payoffs. 
Instead of following Simon’s limited rationality as such, in practice (referring to the 
abovementioned findings) the entrepreneurs’ decisions seem to follow a heuristic called the 
recognition principle. To rewind a few steps, if knowledge of accounting (safely, I believe, 
assumed to be correlated with financial/university background) leads to less outsourcing then 
it should be assumed that accounting is, even in the SME scale, highly specific. However, 
Everaert et al. (2010) also found that for more highly educated CEOs, asset specificity was 
positively (although non-significantly) correlated for routine tasks. The recognition principle 
states that “if one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized 
object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.” (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 
76). 
What seems to be going on, in line with the recognition principle, is that if the 
entrepreneur does not have a gut feel about how to tackle the issue (of accounting), he 
outsources and someone else takes care of both the planning and the execution of the issue. 
This takes the full picture of bounded rationality into account: payoffs are simplified between 
integration (feelings of difficulty and inadequacy – not good – for the non-skilled and feelings 
of control and power – good – for the skilled) and outsourcing (feelings of simplicity and 
empowerment – good – for the non-skilled and feelings of insecurity and loss of control – not 
good – for the skilled). Unless, of course, one remembers that Everaert et al. (2010) also found 
that trust is a controlling variable here: if the more skilled CEO trusts the partner, the negative 
feelings about outsourcing are diminished or positive feelings compensate for them.  
This takes bounded rationality into account in its entirety. Thus, bounded rationality is 
indeed something to take into account (although it seems to be massively endogenous to the 
competence-based theories, i.e. when one takes into account the skills within the organization 
prior to the decision), but perhaps not in the manner Williamson means. 
This leads to the final point: limits of rationality are very real, but they do not matter 
much. Indeed, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) also found that further information does not 
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necessarily improve decision making – instead, it can make it worse. The availability heuristic, 
stating that if something is easily recalled it is thought to be important, helps to understand 
why. Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 231) wrote:  
Most important decision men make are governed by beliefs concerning the likelihoods of 
unique events. The “true” probability of such events are elusive, since they cannot be 
assessed objectively. The subjective probabilities that are assigned by knowledgeable 
and consistent people have been accepted as all that can be said about the likelihood of 
such events.  
There are unforeseen events, positive and negative, both because and regardless of the 
boundaries of the firm. An expert of TCE sees everything through TCE and an agency theorist 
sees everything through his lens. The boundaries of rationality do not matter without 
opportunistic tendencies. Next we will see why we do not have to pay much attention to those. 
4.4 Opportunism 
In TCE, opportunism is to be feared. Williamson orders us to safeguard against the hazards of 
opportunism (1985, p. 32). In fact, I do not disagree, but I disagree almost completely how this 
is achieved. My argument is two-sided. First, one must fear the type of opportunism described 
by agency theory, i.e. the agent-principal problem. Second, I argue that opportunism has very 
little to do with organization. 
As was pointed out, agency is about the contract. In short, the agent-principal problem 
is caused by an asymmetry between the agent’s and the principal’s best interests. While this 
type of opportunism is very real and possibly even dangerous, it can be equally likely and 
destructive regardless of firm boundaries. Indeed, if anything, it will be easier to control this 
type of opportunism through outsourcing which enables the periodic sorting of employees 
through the rewriting of contracts. 
The whole point of agent-principal problems is that the contract, whether explicit or 
implicit, is such that it directs the incentives of the agent in the wrong direction. This can 
happen by either active misdirection (e.g. rewarding for increasing ROA, thus encouraging to 
sell off functions rather than looking forward, thus directing the employee to the wrong 
direction) or by passive non-direction (e.g. rewarding low-level workers for enterprise results 
(which automatically means they are also punished for sub-par results) although any one of 
them has only a minuscule effect on that; thus, the rewards do not direct the employee to the 
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desired direction). Opportunistic behavior can happen mostly with the former (the differences 
can be huge), and in the case of non-direction opportunism is mostly related to avoidance of 
working. 
The difference between the agent-principal opportunism and TCE opportunism is that 
agency opportunism is approved opportunism: it is sanctified by the firm that wishes to avoid 
the opportunism. Thus, it really is in the agent’s best interests to behave opportunistically (at 
least to some extent). TCE opportunism faces feedback problems: opportunistic behavior can 
lead to integration, and to a loss of reputation. As Hill (1990) points out, the invisible hand 
tends to push these opportunistic suppliers from the market. Opportunistic employees, then 
again, are very, very rarely pushed out of the market. 
Although asset specificity can be claimed to be the most important construct of the 
transaction cost paradigm, it is that only because of opportunism. Indeed, Williamson (1993, 
p.97) claims that: “But for opportunism, most forms of complex contracting and hierarchy 
vanish.” This is quite simply not true. It is true for the internal logic of TCE, but not true in the 
real world. 
For instance, consider a flat and a hierarchical organization. A hierarchical organization 
is better at avoiding type I errors (false positives) whereas a flat organization is better at 
avoiding type II errors (false negatives). This is because in a hierarchical organization a 
decision needs more approvals than in a flat one.  
For example, a franchise does decisions that affect the entire franchise hierarchically in 
the headquarters, but leaves daily decisions to franchisees; the decisions where false positives 
can have fourth-quadrant negative impacts should not be left to be done ad hoc by a franchisee, 
but then again it would be needless to harness the power of Ph.D. analysts, project managers 
and C level executives (with their respective costs) to decide whether to give people a free 
access to the toilet. Hierarchy needs not be costly in the TCE manner because it can be a source 
of synergy and efficiency. 
4.4.1 Game theory 
That strategic rivalry in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a 
one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. 
-Fudenberg & Maskin (1986) 
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The above quote continues: “Repeated play allows players to respond to each other's actions, 
and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. The 
fear of retaliation may thus lead to outcomes that otherwise would not occur." (Fudenberg and 
Maskin, 1986, p. 553). The point of this quote should be clear by the end of this chapter. 
Game theory is a very useful theory to bring into the discussion. As Spaniel (2011, loc. 48) 
points out, the game theory studies interdependent actions, or in the author's words: "Situations 
where my actions affect both my welfare and your welfare and vice versa." Thus, game theory 
discusses by its very nature complex things, and many game theoretic dilemmas can be thought 
of in TCE terms when they are simple, one-off games. 
The basic idea of game theory is that each agent has several options at any point of 
time, and the agents must choose a strategy that yields the best outcome for the agent him or 
herself. The prisoner's dilemma is an example where for the each agent opportunistic (in terms 
of TCE) behavior dominates cooperative behavior. However, the best strategy changes when 
an iterated modification is played, that is, the game is played repetitively. In this chapter, I will 
show that the best strategy is very, very rarely an opportunistic one. 
The game theory aficionados have already likely linked the previous chapter to their 
theory-based reasoning. Indeed, game theory gives us similar results. Furthermore, game 
theory even shows us that opportunism is not a problem except in two very specific cases which 
means that incomplete contracts are not bound for opportunistic behavior. The specific cases 
are, first, a take-the-money-and-run situation where either of the parties is in a dead end in any 
case, and second, short-sightedness. The former of these will be returned after a while, but the 
latter is shortly discussed here. 
Short-sightedness means that a player plays a dominant strategy in a subgame, not 
understanding that it is only a part of a (very much) larger game. The problem is, the latter is 
not a zero-sum game, but a sub-zero-sum game: it does not share the pie differently, but in fact 
throws away the pie. An example of short-sightedness would be to take a potentially lethal 
overdose of medication for an annoying headache. It solves the immediate problem, but in 
doing so causes much more severe problems for the agent. 
The games in tables 4-1 and 4-2 show the inherent TCE logic. Integration always 
produces similar outcomes for both parties: the prospective contractor gains 2. The gain is 2 
and not 3 because while it gets the job done, it is more costly than the job would be on the 
market. Thus, market would be a better place to be considering just the production costs. The 
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supplier’s gains when in contract are two in the non-specific and three in the specific case 
because specificity increases the value. 
Outsourcing then again produces different results. When the asset is non-specific, 
outsourcing and cooperation weakly dominates other options: the contractor does not care 
about opportunism because it is easy to switch, and thus outsourcing is strictly dominant, that 
is, the best strategy regardless of the other party. For the supplier, opportunism is a bad idea 
because cooperation weakly dominates opportunism, that is, under no conditions is 
opportunism a good idea. 
Table 4-1: The game without asset specificity 
 Supplier 
Contractor 
 Cooperation Opportunism 
Outsourcing 3,2 3,1 
Integration 2,0 2,0 
 
In turn, specific assets change the game. Again, integration produces a decent result 
regardless of opportunism. Cooperation produces the best possible result because here the 
contractor enjoys production cost savings and the contractor gets a higher return than for non-
specific assets. However, opportunistic strategy again weakly dominates, so there is incentive 
for that. 
There is no questioning this. Williamson (1983) even offers a clear tool to support this 
beneficial exchange: credible commitments (a term used in game theory also). Everything 
looks to be in order, and that's that. 
Table 4-2: The game according to transaction cost economics under asset specificity 
 Supplier 
Contractor 
 Cooperation Opportunism 
Outsourcing 3,3 1,4 
Integration 2,0 2,0 
 
However, everything is not in order. This is because the actual game that is played is a 
multi-stage one, and this means that the credible commitment exists whether or not there is 
hostage-swapping (e.g. common ownership). Initially, there must be outsourcing for this game 
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to take place, so payoffs are 3,3. Then, in the second stage, the supplier gets to have a go. If it 
chooses opportunistic behavior, payoffs are 1,4. However, at a later point in time, the contractor 
gets to have a go first. If there is suspicion of opportunism, it will choose to integrate. Thus the 
payoffs will be 2,0.  
For example, consider this game where the supplier behaves opportunistically at stage 
three. The stages are time-dependent, but they are not necessarily any specific amounts of time, 
like years. For instance, if the contract is set for two years at a time, each stage could be seen 
to be two years. 
Table 4-3: The payoffs with asset specificity with opportunism in stage three. 
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 
Contractor 3 3 1 2 2 
Supplier 3 3 4 0 0 
 
Is it really beneficial for the supplier to behave opportunistically? No. It will lose the 
contract entirely and that leads to no profits at all. This is why there is no threat of opportunism, 
ever, in the standard case.  
There is, however, a special case where opportunism might occur. This is one in which 
the other party knows that the game is coming to an end, and the other one does not. Note that 
"the game" here refers to not only the current transaction, but transactions for one party 
altogether. That is, a contract might be coming to an end, but if there are other contracts as well 
as possible future contracts, then the game is not over. Thus, it could be for instance a case 
where the seller is trying to get as much money out as possible before escaping the law to a 
paradise island. Needless to say, any dealings with such a partner should be avoided entirely, 
at least in legitimate businesses. 
So for instance let us assume that the current transaction is coming to an end, and view 
this first as a discrete, 5-stage case. In this case, the payoffs would look like this: 
Table 4-4: Opportunism at the endgame. 
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 
Contractor 3 3 3 3 1 
Supplier 3 3 3 3 4 
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However, in a much larger picture, let us assume that the company has in total five 
contracts, and one of them is coming to an end, and it will be looking for a replacement. In 
each of the following periods, one of the other contracts is coming to an end, with a replacement 
to be found. Here the payoffs would look like this: 
Table 4-5: Endgame opportunism in a larger scale. 
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractor 3 3 3 3 3/1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Opportunism 15 15 15 15 16 13 10 7 4 0 
Cooperation 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
Clearly, this is a simplification, but the point is that if the supplier is known for 
opportunistic behavior, its revenues will in the long run converge to zero. In turn, the company 
can expect to maintain its current level of activities when it cooperates. Thus, if the partner is 
looking to keep going, there are no real scares of opportunism.  
Another point to be considered from Table 4-4. Even if there would be some scares of 
opportunism, one should not be usually too worried about it. This is because in the discrete, 5-
stage game one gets 4*3+1 = 13 if you outsource and the supplier is opportunistic, but only 
5*2 = 10 if one integrates. Savings of just over 20% are quite often reported (e.g. Han and 
Mithas, 2013; Jackson et al., 2001); this is similar as the difference between 13 and 10 points. 
Theoretically, TCE takes this into account, but not really. That is, the (potential) costs of 
opportunism may be a reason to integrate, but they need to be absolutely massive in order for 
it to be productive to integrate. 
4.5 Transaction costs 
The transaction costs themselves need to be questioned. Indeed, even Williamson has started 
using the term maladaptation costs (Klein, 2014). 
Be as it may, let us look at the transaction costs. Two types of transaction costs were 
identified: ex-ante and ex-post costs. While it is clear that all types of transactions, whether 
within organizations or at the market, carry these costs it is also clear that the significance of 
ex-ante costs converge toward zero. Of course the costs themselves do not vanish, but as the 
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contract incurs more production and ex-post transaction costs the share of these one-off ex-
ante costs withers away. Thus, unless the ex-ante costs are extreme their investigation is 
somewhat tangential. 
The ex-post costs then again are more important. Let us look at those in more detail, 
and see if they are only occurred at the market. 
Maladaptation costs were those of re-defining the contract when it is not meaningful 
anymore. Clearly, these costs are incurred even within integrated firms. It is useful to 
distinguish two types of maladaptation: I shall call them positive and negative. Positive 
maladaptation is a situation where an asset is clearly valuable to the company, but it needs to 
be altered in some way. Negative maladaptation, unsurprisingly, is when an asset no longer 
remains valuable, and needs to be done away with. 
An example of positive maladaptation could be such where an employee has other 
options, or in plain terms wishes to leave for a better (paying) job elsewhere. Here, the firm 
must provide the employee with a better offer, or lose the investment in firm-specific human 
capital, that is, the value-creating on-the-job learning acquired by the employee. The situation 
can lead to two different scenarios. 
First, the contracting organization is not made aware of the situation by the supplier. 
Hence, the supplier bears the risk from finding another employee (or needs to shave its margins 
by offering a higher wage). The performance falls, but costs remain the same. 
Second, the contracting organization is made aware of the situation. The contracting 
organization can either integrate the employee or change the contract with the supplier on the 
condition the supplier retains the employee. The performance remains the same, but costs go 
up. There seems to be no difference whether the asset is outsourced or integrated when 
maladaptation is positive. 
For negative maladaptation, it all depends on the salvage value. If it is higher, then 
owning the asset will be better. However, there are two issues. Firstly, asset maladaptation 
cannot be predicted, and so the potential salvage value is a mystery. Secondly, and more 
importantly, specific assets by definition ought to carry lower salvage values, ceteris paribus.  
For non-salvageable assets (i.e. human assets), asset specificity does the same. If for 
the person the current employer is the only option (e.g. industrial workers in factory towns), it 
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will be difficult to get rid of him. If outsourced, the contract will end one day. If integrated, it 
will not, and that will be more difficult, or at least more costly. 
It must be pointed out that these points only mean that there is really no way of telling 
in advance whether the total costs will be higher or lower, whether there is room for more or 
less opportunistic behavior under maladaptation given higher or lower asset specificity. This 
really underpins the problem with transaction cost economics: sometimes they seem to be 
correct, sometimes not. But it should be remembered that even a broken watch is correct twice 
a day. 
For the other ex-post costs, haggling meant filling the blanks. If there are several 
possible suppliers, there is no reason to expect severe haggling costs: the blanks can be left 
unfilled, and another supplier hired to fill in (or do the same internally). Moving forward, this 
means that at the end of the contract the opportunistic haggler can be removed from the 
equation if the fill-in supplier is willing to take over the tasks. Indeed, it can even hire away 
the people from the nasty haggler, meaning the business can continue as usual, same work done 
by the same people, changing just the name of the employer. 
Governance costs are actually the real deal. They occur and must be taken into account. 
Indeed, if there is severe behavioral uncertainty and the asset is very valuable (regardless of 
specificity), I can see that the potential production cost savings could be offset by the 
governance costs. So they must be taken into account. 
Bonding then again can sometimes be somewhat costly. Usually they are not much 
more costly than when integrated since there are also internal rules (processes) that provide for 
security, also sometimes at the cost of effectiveness. Offshoring could increase these costs: if 
the supplier needs to contact the contractor, it could result in large delays if the time zone 
difference is large.  
Finally, the description of transaction costs as friction is a poor one. Indeed, transaction 
cost economics would be great if transaction costs were in fact friction. There are two different 
problems with the view of transaction costs as friction. First, production costs, not transaction 
costs, are friction: they are the motion-resisting force that must always be overcome. The reader 
may or may not remember the note on Ang and Straub (1998) in the literature section: while 
transaction costs were not completely irrelevant, production cost savings were seen six times 
as important as transaction costs. Here is why: no strategy that buys for $2 and sells for $1 will 
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work in the long run. However, if one buys for $1 and sells for $2, one will make money, and 
if transaction costs occur at some point, they can be adapted to by, for instance, integration. 
The other problem is that of measurability. Friction is not something that appears or 
disappears out of the blue. The amount of friction in (simple, linear) physical systems can be 
predicted quite easily with great precision. If the price – that is, the driver of revenue which is 
the energy source – takes into account some wild amount of friction "just to be sure", it will 
definitely be too high for anyone to buy the product. One does put an airplane jet engine on a 
bicycle. 
4.6 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in transaction cost economics is divided into two categories: environmental and 
behavioral uncertainties. The former refers to volatility in demand, and the latter to how easy 
it is to measure the outputs (i.e. protecting against opportunistic behavior). Both kinds, it is 
argued, lead to higher transaction costs. 
First, I argue that environmental uncertainty should lead to higher rates of outsourcing, 
not lower. Second, I argue that integration does not help with the issue of behavioral 
uncertainty. 
The argument for the higher rates of outsourcing derives from the very same 
explanation that in TCE is used for the opposite argument. Indeed, it is probably easier to 
allocate resources to different tasks within the firm than it would be outside it (due to e.g. 
bonding costs), but the problem is that specialized employees are better at doing their 
specialties rather than switching into other tasks. 
In fact, we need nothing else than the law of large numbers to disprove the original 
position. Suppose a company specialized in accounting takes charge of the accounting of a 
number of companies. The larger the number, the better, but any number above one will do. 
Since the law states that the mean of the sample converges toward the population mean as the 
sample size increases, the volatility diminishes. This is due to the fact that one accountant can 
quite easily take over for the other since the firm uses largely the same tools and procedures 
regardless of the client. 
Why this is more important when the volatility is high than when it is low is that when 
the volatility is low one can expect that the employee will do what he is good at doing for most 
of the time, and if the demand is surprisingly high for a short period of time extra hours can be 
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put in. Thus, the volatility pooling done by the specialist organization is of less use. (This is 
actually also a prime example of how difficult it is to compare actual assets: the service offered 
by the supplier is not the same service that would be produced internally.) 
Feedbacks within the organization come to play, also: when does the accountant have 
more to do? When there are more things to do in general. If invoices need to be handled by the 
accountant then there is more to do when there are more invoices. Obviously, there are more 
invoices when there is more sales meaning the production department, the sales people, etc. all 
have more to do. This is a positive feedback loop. 
The danger with positive feedback was already mentioned, and the way in which (in 
this case) the loop can be more or less stopped is sharing. If two or more companies share a 
market, that is, they are playing a zero-sum game (at least in the short term), then the way they 
can get more accountants is to use a shared source. If one company increases its sales, the other 
companies’ share of the pie becomes smaller, but the share source remains somewhat stable. 
Thus, the dangerous positive feedback loop was countered with negative feedback. 
Generally, though, this is not the case as the companies’ sales are likely to be mostly 
independent of each other (although both are dependent on the market situation). Even in this 
case outsourcing is better. If one company employs a CEO and five other people, the doubling 
of tasks requires the doubling of manpower leading to growing governance. However, if those 
five people are all employed by their respective specialist agencies, then that means that each 
of the five agencies needs to hire just one new person. This is most likely why outsourcing 
better enables companies to pay employees by the hour (or use a piece rate). It is much more 
difficult for a company to constantly hire and fire people according to changing needs than to 
call the agency and let them know that they will need more services. 
Integration, I believe, can only help with explicit opportunism, but not with guileful 
behavior. In case of maladaptation, one side can behave opportunistically by refusing to alter 
the contract (or charging all alteration costs – and then some – on the other side). This type of 
opportunism can be guarded against with integration since the contracts allow more room for 
maneuvering. 
Then again, if guileful behavior takes place, then it will be equally difficult to stop it 
regardless of the firm’s boundaries. For instance, if a project manager shirks responsibility and 
avoids doing any real work, it will be a problem whether that project manager works for the 
company directly or through a freelance project manager company (PM is clearly a specific 
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asset). All measurement of the amount and the quality of the work done will have to be done 
through proxies in any case. 
However, there is a hidden benefit in outsourcing: risk reduction (in terms of going from 
a higher quadrant to a lower one). If a guileful person acts against the firm’s best interest in a 
classic agent-principal manner then having that person on the firm’s payroll can be disastrous. 
For instance, if a construction worker makes a mistake building a house, the seller of the house 
is not responsible when the roof comes down – as long as the seller’s firm was not the employer 
of that worker. Likewise, the worker is not responsible if the materials were flawed. The point 
is: deeper vertical integration leads to higher-quadrant risks. 
4.7 Frequency 
Frequency refers to the buyer’s activity in the market, and, as mentioned, ought to increase 
asset specificity through specialization, thus leading to lower levels of outsourcing. The 
activity, traditionally, is divided into two categories, occasional and recurrent. 
Since asset specificity is the underlying reason for the inverse correlation between 
frequency and outsourcing, it is useful to refer to what was previously said about asset 
specificity. In particular, the underlying asset is to be questioned. For instance, large 
corporations barely pay any tax on their profits because their accounting is so highly 
specialized. Accounting, then, is no longer a support function, but a strategic function: because 
of diseconomies of scale, global firms that employ people in the tens and hundreds of thousands 
require such tax planning to remain viable. The problem, even then, is not necessarily the 
amount, but the fact that there quite simply is not such an asset that is required on the market. 
But frequency does not always increase asset specificity. For instance, invoice entry is 
largely the same business whether there are 10 or 10000 invoices per month. Indeed, frequency 
enables to narrow down tasks, thus increasing the proportion of rule-based logic for some jobs, 
which in turn decreases asset specificity. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter shows some possible, but real and clear violations of transaction cost economics. 
Indeed, the extremely linear and static nature of the TCE seems to completely miss the complex 
nature of the world.  
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What is even more concerning is that sometimes TCE does not make any sense in 
economic terms, either. That is, while for instance behavioral economics – largely started by 
Simon’s bounded rationality – challenges the homo œconomicus logic in that humans are not 
Laplacian demons, it still makes sense economically: one takes shortcuts in decision making 
because that is more economical. So instead of understanding everything perfectly, people 
understand enough (or at least we think we do) to make a decision.  
All in all, a broken watch is right twice a day. TCE is not a broken watch, but it does 
have a systematic error: it measures things that are not quite correct, but that have some 
endogeneity with what is. Quite a lot of endogeneity, in fact, since studies show that it is right 
in about one in two or three cases. Bottom line: asset specificity may cause integration, but 
integration may also cause asset specificity (which implies that outsourcing would remove 
asset specificity), and not only that, but they may also be caused by a third factor, such as the 
ones described by competence-based theories. 
Finally, I do understand where TCE is coming from: the world was quite different 30 
or more years ago, and the landmark in outsourcing, the deal between Eastman Kodak and 
IBM, had not been seen yet. Thus, it is not difficult to see that TCE would seem brilliant under 
those circumstances. However, the world has changed, and whether this means that TCE is 
proven wrong or that transaction costs (or asset specificity) have very nearly vanished, thus 
rendering the theory obsolete, understanding TCE is not very useful these days.  
Personally, I believe that both of the reasons speculated have happened. First, TCE does 
not take all aspects into account, so it was always going to produce mixed results. Second, the 
amazing developments in the information and communications technology (e.g. internet and 
open source standards) have produced results few of us could have predicted. One of these 
results is that fewer things are now specific because so much more of the value addition is done 
through software (or through other, inexpensive ways): the manufacturing robot is easily 
reprogrammed, and visually creative people in the marketing department are being replaced by 
math geeks who are equally adept at quantitative trading. The specificity comes from designing 
the proper constellations, not from the assets themselves. 
When one puts these two (partnerships and commoditization) together, the result is that 
the important asset is the ability to control the partnerships, but that is not so specific because 
mostly those who excel at relationship management can easily be moved into a different 
transaction without a huge loss of value.  
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5 Control & Creativity – implications of complexity 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theory of what to outsource that takes complexity 
into account, per the second research question. There are two factors that are important in terms 
of complexity: control and creativity. The first of these refers to the ability to force changes 
upon the organization, and the latter to the ability to try new things.  
5.1 A particular task is to be accomplished 
The heading is a direct quote (Williamson, 1985, p. 20, chapter Transaction Cost Economics, 
subchapter Explication, second sentence) and represents a very profound assumption that 
underlies the whole of transaction cost economics. The particular (or primary) task of any given 
organization is to survive. The rest is more or less unparticular. Survival, in turn, is ensured 
with effectiveness, which in most organizations’ case is the ability to make money. I have thus 
far been able to identify two factors that affect survival: control and creativity. Creativity means 
potential for success, control to the ability to execute. Such dictionary-like definitions mean 
nothing as such so in this chapter those two ideas are explained in more detail.  
5.2 What is control? 
First, control is not micromanagement. Micromanagement leads to efficiency, but also to lock-
ins, that is, micromanagement would be great if everything would be static, or even linear, that 
is, predictable.  
Instead, control is the ability to adapt and evolve, to actively change things when 
necessary. If this type of control is lost, a cascading failure of the system which is the firm is 
not a question of if it will happen, but rather when it will happen. Thus, control is not about ex-
ante making sure nothing negative will happen. It is making sure that if and eventually when 
something goes wrong somewhere, that is, the organization is no longer fit to the task (or more 
appropriately, the task to which the organization is fit is no longer a good survival strategy), 
the organization has the power to change things. This is perfectly shown by a recent HBR 
article (Reeves et al., 2015) in which the authors discuss under which circumstances a certain 
type of strategy should be chosen. 
It should be noted that something goes wrong every day: an employee takes a sick day, 
a report takes a little longer to write – whatever that deviates from absolute perfection. Being 
in control means that there are mechanisms that enable the organization to adapt to these 
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deviations. Sometimes, the deviations can be large. For instance, a disruptive technology 
completely changes the earnings logic of the entire business. Here, being in control requires 
that the entire strategy and organization is changed quickly, as if in punctuated equilibrium.  
For a small part, control is also about key control variables. This is where transaction 
cost economics might have a role to play if a bilateral monopoly does not exist. Key control 
variables are assets that if taken out of the equation, the firm will in all likelihood tip over into 
chaos, basically that they will have great difficulties to continue operations. But this is only 
relevant in cases where bilateral monopolies do not exist: if an asset is equally specific for both 
sides of a transaction, the hostage logic underlies the transaction regardless of ownership and 
contracting issues as game theory shows us. Note however that if there are bilateral monopolies 
and no threatening asymmetries of specificity, the firm is unlikely to be threatened by 
opportunism. 
It must be pointed out that the ability to adapt, which is what control is, is inversely 
correlated with control variables. Think of a house of cards: if any card falls, the whole thing 
will be gone. Control is thus also negative feedback, and they are enabled through networks. 
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, but a net is barely affected when one link fails. 
The skill is in balancing between chains and nets, because too tightly bound nets are completely 
indestructible; this means that the management loses the ability to control the organization. On 
the contrary, too loose coupling means there is not much value added (i.e. the modular nature 
of the business means that anyone can do the same product and thus margins are shaved paper-
thin). Thus, strategizing is of the highest importance. 
5.3 What is creativity? 
Creativity is freedom. It is the freedom to play, to try new things, do things differently. Indeed, 
it is the very same thing that control is: agents, whether cellular automata, individual creatures, 
or employees, change themselves to create something new, and collectives, whether species or 
firms, may change themselves adopting the new ways of working if those new ways are better, 
and that may spread over industries. 
Creativity on the organizational level then refers to two things. The first of them is the 
ability to create new products, and the second to creating and changing interconnections, or 
couplings, between tasks, between people, and between tasks and people. As pointed out, the 
particularity of things is difficult to point out. To produce a widget or a service, the organization 
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can take many shapes. Furthermore, changing something about the product can enable equal 
or greater fitness through different logics. This is what is commonly known as disruption. 
Disruption (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) takes two shapes: low-market disruption 
and new-market disruption. Low-market disruption refers to a model where (a part of) the 
customers are satisfied with a lesser product when it comes with a significantly lesser price tag. 
This is due to the fact that consumers are not always willing to pay the premium for feature 
innovation because the innovations exceed their ability to use those features. On the other hand, 
the new-market disruption is the ability to bring the new product to customers whose other 
option is not buying the expensive model, but not buying anything at all.  
Creativity, in those terms, can be seen equally as either producing novel products or 
producing novel ways to make non-novel products (but since the underlying logic is novel, the 
product is novel, too, although it would be designed to do the same thing as the other). For 
instance, electronic invoicing does nothing new as such, but the way in which it works enables 
massive cost savings as well as improved business intelligence. Or as cheaper airlines provide 
the same basic service as the more expensive ones, their novel business models leads to flight 
being used differently. 
5.4 Interaction effects 
Control is the ability to change things. Creativity is the ability to change things. But they are 
not the same thing: creativity is evolution, while control is revolution. Hillis (1990) showed 
how evolution took place between two species through a simulation. On a large scale, this 
reminded of the so-called punctuated equilibrium, a theoretical model of evolution where 
periods of stasis, that is, non-changing of survival strategies, are punctuated by rather rapid 
changes; the evolution seemingly leaps from one equilibrium to another. 
However, what happened under the bonnet was that – using my terminology – creativity 
took place all the time, and when time was ripe, this creativity had produced new strategy that 
was superior to the old one, and quickly the strategy was spread out, as though by revolution. 
How was this possible? Because agents, that is, single parasites (or rather, Ramps), had 
autonomy. Without it, they could not have had changed 
Control and creativity are thus non-competing, but complementary factors. Creativity is 
needed for evolution, but control is needed for autonomy, to make the required changes to the 
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large-scale survival strategy. The paradoxical state of concurrent boundedness and freedom is 
the source of fitness over periods of time. 
5.5 Control and creativity in practice 
5.5.1 Control 
Control requires that companies remain autonomous, and this is the job of the board of 
directors. Technically speaking, the board of directors sometimes gives power (that is, 
outsources its own decision making) to the executives; in most cases (remembering that SMEs 
account for about 100% of all companies), though, the people in the board are the ones who 
execute these strategic revolutions. They are the ones (through the CEO) who punctuate the 
equilibrium when necessary. 
A more important part of keeping in control is to make sure that the organization is 
managed in a manner that enables change. If the organization is extremely tightly coupled and 
the internal links are too tight, that is, if what Stacey (1996) calls shadow networks are too 
strong, then changing may be impossible and the company almost certainly faces implosion. I 
have no problem seeing how this can be applied to failures in mergers and acquisitions, or for 
instance the problems that the public sector is facing in many European countries. This is also 
an agency problem. Outsourcing is in fact extremely good for this because medium- or short-
term contracts are more easily eliminated and replaced by alternative constellations than if they 
were integrated. This is to say: too much integration leads to a loss of control. 
5.5.2 Creativity 
Creativity, then again, requires room for maneuvering. This is the job of integrated employees. 
An integrated employee is more difficult, not easier, to control, but then again the employee is 
more in control, and can search for alternative fitness peaks, that is, novel strategies to do 
something. 
Creativity, in essence, is thus decision making. The one who decides is the creator, not 
the controller. The controller’s job is to actuate decisions. For instance, a product designer 
makes decisions regarding the product that he designs. If these decisions need to be based on 
rules, such as a certain results from market research, they are not decisions any more than the 
clerk’s decision to charge the price on the label. It is extremely important to understand where 
the creativity is situated, and sometimes it is also quite difficult. 
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Not all creativity needs to be integrated, though. That would lead to integration 
cascades. Just the creativity that the firm wants to make money on. The said market research 
is a good example. The production company outsources market research because it does not 
intend to make money with it – just with the results. The market research company, then again, 
might outsource the call center responsible for the interviews because it does not intend to 
make money on that, the creativity for it lies within the art of questionnaire design, numerical 
analysis, and presentation of findings.  
5.5.3 How to be creative and in control 
Both control and creativity are fairly easily attained. Control can be achieved by either keeping 
ownership in-house, that is, keeping most of the ownership of the firm with the entrepreneur, 
or by having a large enough owner base, like publicly traded stock companies. The danger zone 
lies with venture capitalists (or other special cases, such as governmental ownership) who are 
interested only in developing the firm (or perhaps just one patent or trademark that the firm 
holds) so that someone wants to buy it off. Clearly, there are two benefits from VC money: the 
ability to develop the firm at least to the point of exit, and in many cases the entrepreneur, too, 
stands to make a huge sum of money from that. So it is not to say that VC money is somehow 
evil, just that it is not interested about paying for someone to be able to work on a darling 
mission for the rest of his life. 
 Control thus takes two forms: in the JSCs, control is self-organization in a species-like 
manner: the species develops to account for the changes in the environment through small 
changes made by the employees, individual members of the species. In the entrepreneur-held 
companies, control is more like in individuals who can try new things, some of which have 
better and others worse consequences. This also helps explaining why big and small firms are 
better at different things. 
Creativity can be achieved through excess and redundancy. This means that there must 
be enough time to develop things, whether they are new products or new ways of working. 
TCE in some way refers to this by the concept of behavioral uncertainty: it will be difficult to 
measure the work these people do since their output is ambiguous. However, the output of, say, 
complicated (and even complex) analytics is also ambiguous, meaning it is impossible to 
measure how good the analysis is, but this can be outsourced because it is not necessarily 
creative. The aim of that job is to produce solid analysis, but solid analysis is not creative, but 
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based on rules and judgment. (And it is also important to remember that an analyst’s production 
is also ambiguous within organizations.) 
This market analysis can be used for, say, new-product development or organizational 
changes, but the creative part is not in doing the analysis, but making use of it. In turn, the 
creativity for analysis is located in how the analysis is done. If the firm wishes that then 
obviously they will need to integrate the mathematicians, statisticians, developers, data and 
system architects, and so on. This helps explain why outsourcing is so popular: specialists can 
create wonderful, modular products that can be customized to many uses with relatively small 
effort, possibly using other specialists that take the previous specialists’ product. The 
connection to IT in previous is obvious, but it could have easily been the auto industry, kitchen 
furniture, or translator services. As long as the interfaces between the systems work, it is of 
little consequence whether those interfaces are between firms or business units. 
5.6 Implications from the control and creativity theory 
The aforementioned means that control and creativity can be attained and held on to using an 
almost infinite number of different organizational constellations. Because of this, there is in 
fact very little that cannot be outsourced and indeed, almost everything can be outsourced. 
There are three things which direct the outsourcing decision. 
First, value addition. Value is added by the process which takes inputs and transforms 
them into outputs. The firm can only make money through these processes, nothing else. So, if 
the firm is able and willing to do these processes, they should not be outsourced. If they are 
outsourced, someone else makes the money on those processes, and the firm must find 
alternative processes with which to make money. 
Second, there needs to be someone that will take care of the process. That is, there needs 
to be market supply for those outputs that the firm wishes to buy. If there is not, it is obviously 
impossible to outsource. Furthermore, the more standard the service, the better. If the service 
is completely standard, it will also be very cheap in comparison to a completely idiosyncratic 
process. In turn, if it will have to be tailored from scratch, the cost savings will likely be 
insignificant. 
Third, the firm must be able to use the outsourcing. This requires that the firm has the 
technical and the organizational interfaces that are necessary links between the company and 
its supplier. In practice, this means that if the firm is using an idiosyncratic system the 
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outsourcing could be either disruptive or very costly. Of course, if the firm uses something 
non-standard they should think very hard if it is good for them or not. In the future, it will cost 
the firm a lot to train people non-standard skills, and the so-called best practices are called best 
because they usually are just that. Continuing to do something instead of changing comes at an 
opportunity cost. 
Because all of these requirements are quite simple, the difficulty lies somewhere else. 
I hypothesize that that somewhere is in managing the outsourcing properly. Outsourcing is 
obviously at first a project, so successful management of that project ensures continuity of 
operations as well as averts costly traps.  
In the long run, meaningful management of the relationship between the contractor and 
the supplier is required so that the relationship itself remains meaningful for both. Indeed, 
secrecy, hard bargaining and such tend to lead to the loss of benefits of the relationship for not 
just one, but both sides. Thus, openness and mutual trust are required so that both parties will 
benefit in the long run. This is true even in the case that will lead to the termination of the 
contract since opportunistic behavior in that situation will in the long run lead to a loss of 
reputation which can lead to going out of business completely. 
On a final note, control and creativity are not competing forces, but rather 
complementary ones, as pointed out before. This means that companies will do well to strike a 
balance between the two. It is similar as debt and cash. Companies that have a lot of debt run 
the risk of financial distress and even bankruptcy. However, those that are sitting on piles of 
cash are inefficient.  
Similarly, too much control means leads to lock-ins which may produce excellent 
results in the short run, but the company might find itself being overtaken by novel approaches. 
In turn, plenty of creativity might produce wildly innovative ideas, but fail to deliver in the 
short run. This then leads to failure to reach the long run as the company does not have the 
sufficient revenue to keep going. Outsourcing and integration, then, should be mixed properly.  
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, the implications of the findings are discussed. First, the research questions will 
be reviewed. Second, the two parts, TCE and complexity, are discussed on their own, and the 
main conclusions are drawn. Finally, there are some recommendations for future research and 
limitations of this study. 
6.1 Research questions 
Here we will see how the study has answered the original research questions. There was clearly 
more success with the first question than the second one, but both questions were answered in 
satisfying detail. 
1. Why transaction cost economics fails when determining sourcing when the complexity 
of organizations and economies is taken into account? 
Drawing from studies as well as a wide variety of theory, I believe it was clearly shown that 
transaction cost economics cannot determine between outsourcing and integration. The clearest 
point against transaction cost economics is that opportunism is often an extremely poor long-
term strategy, and thus very few firms would behave opportunistically even if they could.  
Furthermore, even if some firms would in the long term end up behaving 
opportunistically, the costs of opportunism hardly ever lead to higher total costs when the 
savings are taken into account. Finally, even the basic idea of transaction costs as friction must 
be questioned: higher production costs make it hard to sell a product profitably. Thus, 
production costs should be seen as a force that resists motion. 
Finally, TCE can be used to help understand some parts of contracting, but it is not 
something students should pay much attention to in the large scale. Also, the future is looking 
bleak for TCE as things like open source systems and increasing standardization are likely to 
further lower the transaction costs across the board. 
2. What kind of a theory or framework could better handle the complexities where TCE 
fails? 
The theory described in chapter five can handle the complexities (at least better than TCE can), 
but the problem is that it is difficult to use because it requires so much experience and expertise. 
Obviously, it is wiser to take a sketchy map of the right area and tread carefully rather than to 
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take a detailed map of a wrong area and walk right off a cliff. In this case it could be wiser to 
hone the skills regarding adaptation. 
So, while the theory described answers the question what can we should outsource (or 
rather, what we should consider outsourcing), the main finding was that we should rather try 
to improve our ability to nurture and manage the relationships with our partners than to focus 
on conspiracy theories and preparing for war. It is said, si vis pacem, para bellum, or that if 
you wish peace, prepare for war. Instead, as we see, peace is best acquired by making yourself 
important. After all, it is also said that the dog does not bite the hand that feeds it. 
6.2 Implications from the study of TCE 
It was found that transaction cost economics is violated everywhere when it is used to study 
outsourcing. That is, not even one of the constructs of the TCE holds in every occasion, and 
even the transaction costs themselves are extremely ambiguous. Furthermore, the studies show 
that TCE in outsourcing is not very widely supported whether that is because of the 
shortcomings of managers and academics, or because of the shortcomings of the theory.  
Because of the aforementioned issues, I posit that the TCE should not be used to 
prescribe what should be outsourced. In other words, I feel that studying outsourcing along the 
lines of the usual outsourcing-in-the-light-of-TCE studies should not take place. Since study 
after study shows similar results it can quite safely be said that it is very unlikely that suddenly 
everything would change. As is sometimes said, insanity is doing the same thing over and 
again, expecting different results. The whole body of evidence, seen in the meta-studies, is 
probably strong enough. 
However, I do not wish to say that transaction cost economics cannot give any insights 
as to whether and especially how something should be outsourced. The idea of friction (or 
rather, that the transaction meddles with the desired outcome and the outcome for agency/game 
theoretical reasons) in economic systems is important, but instead of viewing TCE as the all-
encompassing super-theory, it can be used to give some insights. For instance, almost all 
outsourcing contracts should probably take bilateral forms (as they do). 
That said, I cannot possibly agree with Williamson's (1991, p. 76) views that 
strategizing should be secondary to economizing. Instead, the two are irreplaceable and 
interconnected parts of the outsourcing process and phenomenon. Also, TCE puts far too much 
emphasis on opportunism, not to mention other flaws in the theory discussed in chapter four. 
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Much more emphasis should be put on the limits of rationality, because we all know that 
prediction can be very difficult, especially when it is about the future. 
Speaking of future, it is looking quite bleak for transaction cost economizing. As 
complexity of product offering increases and the boundaries of products are becoming more 
vague (e.g. Porter and Heppelmann, 2014), it is becoming increasingly difficult for firms to 
make everything that would be considered specific in-house. Thus, it is becoming ever more 
important to manage partnerships and alliances rather than just economize.  
6.3 Implications from the study of complexity and the new theory 
Before I started to write this thesis, the advisor told me that years ago complexity was all the 
hype, but the hype largely died because it cannot be used to explain anything. While I am 
somewhat more positive about the study of complex systems (see for instance how Bylund 
(2015) disproves Coasean TCE using complex system study methods), the chapter five of this 
thesis gives a good case in point for the less enthusiastic view. That is, if one asks the question: 
"What does your theory say I should outsource?” I do have to admit –  grudgingly – that the 
best answer will be: "It depends.", or  more precisely: "You only need to understand 
microeconomics, available technology and solutions, systems theory, process development, 
project management, and last, but definitely not least your own business and product from 
every angle, including that of the users’, so that you can answer that yourself." 
 While there are some reasonable guidelines as to what you should most likely outsource 
(such as non-specific support functions, for instance most firms do not need to build their own 
office laptops), and some others that you should think very, very carefully about before 
outsourcing (such as specific core competences, like many parts of product development), 
those mentioned in the previous paragraph are the only possible correct answers. Because of 
this, I don't think that any theoretical model such as TCE, RBV, or core competencies can 
really prescribe automatically what should or should not be outsourced, and even when they 
do, the theories provide answers that can often be seen as tautologies or truisms and thus 
useless. Simply put, no existing or future theory will be able to answer all the difficult questions 
for every kind of business in all possible situations – at least not if you want clear and simple 
answers, such as support functions or non-specific assets. 
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6.4 The importance of management 
Because of the difficulty of answering the what question, emphasis should be put on the how 
side. Let us call that management. Outsourcing is of course both a project and a continuous 
effort, thus requiring capabilities in both kinds of management – however, in both cases 
cooperation with stakeholders is extremely important. These efforts are likely to be far more 
important than what is being traded. 
Williamson himself (1985, pp. 120-123) has noted the exceptional capability of the 
Japanese auto industry to spin webs of interdependent firms. When each party tries to make 
the counterparty happy in a reasonable way it will benefit the whole network. Only when some 
nodes in the network see that their time is out, for instance because the landscape has changed, 
can they resort to opportunism. But this opportunism will also lead into deeper lock-ins, that 
is, the opportunist will become even further dependent on the contract which, needless to say, 
will not be renewed on opportunistic terms. The markets are extremely powerful in that sense.  
Thus, a better strategy than opportunism is adaptation, because it is the only possible 
strategy. Hard bargaining tends to lead to poor relationships and leave value on the table, as 
Fisher and Ury (2012) point out. That then again leads to the conclusion that in the long run a 
network that both saves on production costs and does not fall prey to warring behavior will 
emerge victorious over those that focus on squabbling over crumbs falling off the table. 
6.5 Recommendations for future research 
As pointed out, outsourcing should not be studied en masse with questionnaires using the 
transaction cost economic predictors of asset specificity, (behavioral and environmental) 
uncertainty, and frequency. Instead, deeper case studies of outsourcing (especially about 
failures thereof) should be done, and it would be interesting to see speculations whether 
transaction cost economics could have helped in formulating a better contract or recommend 
integration, and how that could have affected the situation. 
However, I do feel that instead of these estimations, a better line of enquiry would be 
to assess the process of outsourcing and developing on that. For instance, both my "new theory" 
as well as the earlier theories such as TCE or RBV have a touch of tautology in them, and so it 
seems that it might be impossible to in fact explicitly dictate what should and what should not 
be outsourced. It seems that on the grand scale outsourcing is an unstoppable force, and to 
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paraphrase Williamson (1991, p. 76), students should rather learn how to outsource than what 
to outsource. 
If, however, one wants to follow along these lines, it could be possible to update 
transaction cost economics into something that considers complexity. Indeed, not much needs 
to be changed: instead of either TCE or complexity, consider interaction effects with strategy 
as well as magnitudes. For instance, if demand is extremely price elastic and there are winner-
take-all dynamics, small production cost savings can be important far beyond any scares of 
opportunism, at least in the first place. On the other hand, assume that demand is not extremely 
price elastic and outsourcing can only produce first magnitude savings. Assume also that 
uncertainty potentially leads to losing every penny the firm has ever made. In this case 
integration would of course be an important idea.  
Such a model would of course be much more difficult to both create and use, and I feel 
that it would be counterproductive to sacrifice scarce research resources into making a difficult 
model that orders to consider many, many criteria. Also, there is always the danger of over-
fitting, and anyway the model would suffer from a linear nature. 
Finally, practitioners are the best researchers. The firms pay with their earnings and the 
employees with their careers, but nowhere in job listings have I seen any wishes about 
understanding the TCE theory (or any other such theory, for that matter, but thoroughness, 
analytic mindset, and understanding the big picture are standard requirements). And every 
single job in the field stresses applicants to be customer oriented team players that are quick to 
learn. Those attributes are very desirable in organizational terms, also. 
6.6 Limitations of the study 
The study, as pointed out, has two parts, each of which has their own limitations. The first part, 
regarding the failure of TCE, only has one significant limitation: it is studying TCE only in the 
realm of outsourcing. However, TCE can be (and has been) used in very many ways, and this 
thesis does not even attempt at discussing all of them. However, many concepts and arguments 
discussed at the criticism part can be applied to other uses as well – but some cannot. In the 
future, applicability of TCE in other areas could be evaluated; it could be that TCE is very good 
in other areas, but not quite so in outsourcing. 
The second part, the attempt to create a complex model of outsourcing, has two 
limitations. First, it is obviously only generating a hypothesis which is not tested. This is clearly 
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a major limitation, and I am struggling to operationalize the theory in order to study it. Second, 
complexity science is quite adept at describing events, but not quite so at prescribing courses 
of action. The point is: maybe the reader now understands some dynamics, but cannot still 
know the best course of action. But that is how the world really is: complex, difficult, uncertain. 
6.7 The findings in a nutshell 
I wish to end the thesis by wrapping up in very simple terms the findings of this study. They 
can be divided in three. First, TCE is not a good theory when one considers what to outsource. 
This is proven by earlier studies and dictated by logic. Second, and as a result of the first 
finding, there must be a better theory that can take into account the complexity of economies 
and firms, and such a theory was identified (or rather, outlined). Third, because using such 
theory is extremely difficult (especially operationalizing it into mass studies should be very 
hard), we should rather forget about the what and let those decisions happen on an ad hoc basis, 
and instead focus on the how. In all likelihood, that is all we can speak of. 
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